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I. INTRODUCTION
Mandatory retirement policies have become increasingly fashionable,
despite the general ban on age discrimination established by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).' Over the past fifteen
years, courts have sanctioned mandatory retirement policies in numerous
industries by ruling that age is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business."2
More recently, Congress and various administrative agencies have exempted
entire occupational categories from coverage under the ADEA.3 This
exclusionary trend runs contrary to the goals of the ADEA to promote
employment of older workers based on their ability, prohibit arbitrary age-
based employment policies, and help employers and workers in every segment
of the economy find integrative solutions to the problems arising from an
increasingly older labor market.4 The message of the ADEA, as well as
similarly-oriented state age discrimination laws, is that employers should make
employment decisions on an individualized basis rather than use generalized,
over-inclusive age-based policies and preferences.'
Appointed state judges are among those workers who are susceptible to
mandatory retirement rules. In Gregory v. Ashcrofz' the Supreme Court held
that appointed state judges do not fall within the ADEA's definition of
"employees" because they are high-ranking government policymakers.7 As a
result, they are not protected by federal law prohibiting age-based workplace
1. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994).
2. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (involving appointed state judges);
Williams v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 806 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1986) (involving helicopter test
pilots); Iervolinov. DeltaAirLines, Inc., 796F.2d 1408 (1 th Cir. 1986) (involving airline flight
engineers); EEOC v. Trabucco, 791 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (involving police); see also State ex
rel. Keefe v. Eyrich, 489 N.E.2d 259,261 (Ohio 1986) (stating "we take notice that mandatory
retirement is becoming more popular with both the public and private sectors").
3. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(a), 110
Stat. 3009-23 (1996) (codified at29 U.S.C. § 6230) (1999)) (extinguishing liability forpriorage
discrimination in hiring of firefighters); Prof'I Pilots Fed'n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (approving agency's expansion of mandatory retirement rules in aviation industry).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
5. See id. § 623(f).
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discrimination. Moreover, because age is not considered a suspect class under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, states may set
mandatory age-based retirement policies for their appointed judges unless the
states cannot articulate any rational basis for doing so.8 Under this deferential
standard of review, provisions imposing mandatory judicial retirement policies
have been uniformly upheld,9 and approximately thirty states, including South
Carolina, use them today.'"
Nevertheless, even though many states have mandatory judicial retirement
policies, the public has become increasingly critical of them. While no one
disputes that states have an important interest in maintaining a judiciary fully
capable of performing its duties, critics have argued that mandatory retirement
8. See id. at 470 (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
9. See, e.g., Zielasko v. Ohio, 873 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1989); Hatten v. Rains, 854 F.2d 687
(Sth Cir. 1988); Maimed v. Thomburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1980); Trafelet v. Thompson, 594
F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1979); Rubino v. Ghezzi, 512 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1975); Boughton v. Price, 215
P.2d 286 (Idaho 1950); Saetre v. State, 398 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1986); O'Neil v. Baine, 568
S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); Grinnell v. State, 435 A.2d 523 (N.H. 1981); Diamond v.
Cuomo, 514 N.E.2d 1356 (N.Y. 1987) (per curiam); Maresca v. Cuomo, 475 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y.
1984); State exrel. Keefe v. Eyrich, 489 N.E.2d 259 (Ohio 1986); In re Stout, 559 A.2d 489 (Pa.
1989); Gondelman v. Commonwealth, 554 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1989); Nelson v. Miller, 480 P.2d 467
(Utah 1971); Aronstam v. Cashman, 325 A.2d 361 (Vt. 1974).
10. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.16 (age 70); ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 11 (age 70);
ARiz. CoNST. art. VI, §§ 20,39 (age 70); COLO. CoNsT. art. VI, § 23(1) (age 72); CONN. CONST.
art. V, § 6 (age 70); FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 8 (age 70, except for judges on temporary service or
finishing half-completed term); HAw. CoNST. art. VI, § 3 (age 70); LA. CoNsT. art. V, § 23(B)
(age 70); MD. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3 (age 70); MAss. CoNsT. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. I (age 70); MIcn.
CoNsT. art. VI, § 19 (age 70); MO. CONsT. art. V, § 26(1) (age 70); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 78
(age 70); N.J. CoNsT. art. VI, § 6, 3 (age 70); N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 25(b) (last day of
December after reaching age 70); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6(C) (no election or appointment if age
70 on or before day assumes office); OR. CoNsT. art. VII, § l(a) (end of year after reaching age
75, but state may fix age to not less than 70); TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 1-a(1) (age 75, butstate may
fix age to not less than 70); VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 35 (end of year after attaining 70); WASH.
CONST. art. IV, § 3(a) (end of year after attaining age 75, but legislature may fix age to not less
than 70); Wyo. CoNsr. art. V, § 5 (age 70); D.C. CoDEANN. § 11-1502 (1981) (age 74); 705 ILL.
COmp. STAT. 55/1-1 (West 1999) (age 75); IND. CODEANN. § 33-2.1 to 5.1 (Michie 1998) (age
75); IOWACODEANN. § 602.1610 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000) (age 75 forjustices holding office
before July 1, 1965; age 72 for justices holding office after July 1, 1965; age 72 for all others
except associate juvenile or probate judges 72 or older as of July 1, 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 490.121(12) (West 1999) (last day of month in which justice attains age 70); N.Y. JuD. LAW
23 (McKinney 1983) (end of year in which judge attains 70); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-4.20
(1999) (last day of month in which justice attains age 72); S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-8-60(1) (Law.
Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1999) (age 72); S.D. CODIFIEDLAWs §§ 16-1-4.1, 16-6-31 (Michie 1995)
(January following general election after reaching age 70); UTAH CODE ANN. § 49-6-801(1)
(1998) (age 75); VA. CODEANN. § 51.1-305(BI) (1998) (twenty days aftergeneral assemblynext
eonvenes following 70th birthday). See generally Carol B. Trask, Note, Mandatory Retirement
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policies run counter to this interest. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has remarked that "[t]he remarkable thing about
judges.., is not that they hang on to their jobs to such advanced ages but that
they perform them creditably, and indeed sometimes with great distinction, at
advanced ages."' I Judge Posner writes that "judges can perform creditably at
advanced ages because to be a good judge requires good judgment, and
judgment is a function of age and experience"; 2 therefore, "a mature
professional judgment is central to the concept of a wise judge, and the
intellectual and dispositional qualities that go to create such ajudgment plainly
improve with age up to a point ... and then plateau until senility."'3 This
supports the statement that "our best judges are the most experienced ones." 4
In recent years, opponents of mandatory retirement policies have
repeatedly urged their state legislators to upwardly adjust their state's
retirement age or to abolish the policies altogether.' 5 These efforts have been
remarkably unsuccessful. 6 The lack of success is not surprising given that the
elderly often have difficulty mobilizing significant cross-generational support
for measures protecting them as a class. 7
But while activists have sought legislative repeal of mandatory retirement
policies, these activists, along with scholars and commentators, have apparently
11. RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 181 (1995).
12. Id. at 192.
13. Id. at 194.
14. Editorial, Positions Given on Amendments, BATON ROUGE ADvoc., Oct. 20, 1995, at
8B.
15. See, e.g., Leslie L. Anderson, Age Discrimination: Mandatory Retirementfrom the
Bench, 20 LoY. L. REv. 153 (1974); Scott Makar, In Praise of Older Judges: Raise the
Mandatory Retirement Age?, 71 FLA. BJ. 48, 48 (1997); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Supreme Court
Upholds Mandatory Retirement of State Judges, 75 JUDICATURE 222 (1992); Gary Spencer,
Reform ofJudicialRetirement Sought: Task Force Recommends NewSenior Judge Status, 222
N.Y. L.J. 57 (1999); Daniel Webster & Donald L. Bell, First Principles for Constitution
Revision, 22 NOvAL.Ray. 391,423 (1997);Judicial Term Limits Proposal, ROCKYMTN.NEWs,
Apr. 4, 1995, at 12A; Legislature '97, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Mar. 28, 1997, at 14A; Mid-
America Report, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 18, 1999, at 1.
16. See, e.g., Dina A. Ellis, Bereano, Election Top News of '94, BALT. DAILY REc., Dec.
30, 1994, at I (reporting on defeat of referendum to raise Maryland's mandatory retirement age
from 70 to 75); Murphy Bill Would Help Justice Smith, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Feb. 5, 1991,
at D-3 (reporting on Georgia governor's prior veto of legislation designed to eliminate
mandatory retirement age).
17. Professor Tribe has argued that the elderly should be treated as a "semi-discrete"
minority group or as a "quasi-suspect class" either because they are not seen as a significant
political force or because legislators do not empathize with many oftheir concerns. LAURENCE
H.TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITIoNALLAw § 16-31, at 1593-94 (2d ed. 1988); see also Julie R.
Steiner, Comment, Age Classifications and the Fourteenth Amendment: Is the Murgia Standard
Too Old to Stand?, 6 SEToNHALL CONST.L.J. 263,280-83 (1995) (discussing Justice Thurgood
Marshall's view that age classifications should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because of
the nation's history of discrimination based upon age).
[Vol. 52: 81
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overlooked an independent means of redress: their own individual state
employment laws forbidding age discrimination. State age discrimination laws
typically fill in the gaps left by the ADEA's incomplete coverage. These laws
recognize the important state interest in eradicating age discrimination, and
they allow for generalized age-based employment policies only in narrow
circumstances. 8 Thus, in the absence of a contrary state constitutional
provision or state law exception, appointedjudges"9 may be able to invoke their
state's age discrimination laws against forced retirement.
This Article addresses a question often overlooked by commentators: How
and why might a state's age discrimination laws be invoked to invalidate
mandatory judicial retirement policies?2" Part II briefly highlights the reasons
for mandatory retirement ages and discusses why states still use them today.
Then, this Article's challenge to mandatory retirement policies begins with Part
III, which argues against the Gregory" Court's conclusion that appointed state
judges are "policymakers." Thus, even ifa state's anti-age discrimination law
exempts policymakers from coverage, Part III contends that appointed judges
should not fall within this exempted category of employees.
Parts IV and V discuss and counter the BFOQ defense used to justify
mandatory retirement policies for appointed judges by examining each prong
18. Numerous states with appointed judges have human rights laws that prohibit age-based
discrimination in the workplace unless age is a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the operation of
the business. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2503(a) (1981); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101
(1999); IND. CODEANN. § 22-9-2-1 (Michie 1997); IOWACODEANN. § 216.6(1)(a) (West 1996);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 181.81(1) (West 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(3-a)(d) (McKinney 1993);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (1999); S.C. CODEANN. § 1-13-80 (Law. Co-op. 1986); VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.1-725 (Michie 1995).
19. More than thirty states appoint judges at various levels within theirjudicial system. See
LYLE WARmUCK, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES:
A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONs 19-35 (2d ed. 1993). This Article presumes that elected judges,
like all other elected officials, would be expressly exempted from coverage. Therefore, this
Article does not address possible applications of anti-discrimination law to elected judges.
20. Commentators have devoted their attention exclusively to whether judges should
qualify for the "policymaking" exception without considering whether age is a BFOQ reasonably
necessary for judging. See Alan L. Bushlow, Note, Mandatory Retirement of State-Appointed
Judges Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 476 (1991);
Laura A. Popovitch, Comment, EEOC v. State of Vermont Are Appointed State Judges
"Employees" Under the ADEA?, 20 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 697 (1990); Tina E. Sciocchetti,
Comment, Mandatory Retirement of Appointed State Judges-Age Discrimination, 85 Nw. U.
L. REv. 866 (1991); Darlene M. Severson, Note, Mandatory Retirement of Judges: Law and
Policy-Gregory v. Ashcroft, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 858 (1991); Lawrence A. Walke,
Comment, ExtendingProtection Under the Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct toAppointed
State Judges, EEOC v. State of Vermont, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 359 (1991). But cf. Thomas Alden
Hauser, Note, MandatoryRetirement ofState Judges andtheAge Discrimination in Employment
Act, 51 U. PiTt. L. REv. 973, 975 (1990) ("No court, state or federal, has interpreted the BFOQ
exception to include judges.").
21. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
22. Id. at 485.
2000]
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of the BFOQ test.' Under the first prong, Part IV defines the "essence" of the
judicial function as the adjudication of cases and controversies independently
and free from the appearance of bias24 and then explains why three of the
leadingjustifications for mandatory retirement actually undermine these values
and should be rejected.' Part IV further argues that old age is a poor predictor
ofjudicial ability.
Part V considers mandatory retirement policies in the context of the
second, "impracticability" prong. Courts allow employers to use generalized
age-based policies if individualized treatment is impractical. This determination
necessarily involves questions of efficiency. Individualized treatment is
impractical if it cannot be done at a reasonable social cost. In other words,
courts will not require individual treatment if it is too expensive, too time
consuming, or too imprecise of a predictor of employee performance to be
useful. At the same time, however, age discrimination laws establish a strong
presumption in favor of individual treatment. Courts are reluctant to substitute
an imperfect, generalized employment policy for an equally problematic
individualized one unless the former is more efficient than the latter.26
Furthermore-and this point is often overlooked--courts generally accept an
employer's use of a mandatory, generalized employment policy only if it is a
more acceptable and efficient alternative than individualized analysis.21
Therefore, one may concede that impeachment is an impractical method for
removing incompetent judges without necessarily resigning oneself to
accepting mandatory retirement policies as an acceptable alternative.
Finally, Part VI shows that mandatory retirement policies force judges to
vacate the bench at an age when many would prefer continued employment,
and this creates the potential for bias. Eminent observers including Chief
Justice Rehnquist have warned of the evils associated with the rising number
23. The BFOQ test.has two prongs. The first prong requires that the state (1) define the
"essence of the business" at issue; and (2) show that the essence of the business operation (the
judiciary) would be undermined if the state-employer did not make employment decisions based
on age. W. Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1985). The second prong requires
that the state show that older judges are unable to perform their job functions or that "it is
'impossible or highly impractical' to deal with the older employees on an individualized basis."
Id. at414. Courts generally accept an employer's use ofanmandatory, generalized, employment
policy only if it is a more acceptable and efficient alternative than individualized analyses. See
EEOC v. City of Linton, 623 F. Supp. 724, 726 (S.D. Ind. 1985); see also infra text
accompanying notes 228-89 (discussing the framework used for determining whether
individualized treatment is impractical). PartIVwill discuss the first prong of the BFOQ analysis
and Part V will discuss the second prong.
24. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
25. See inffra text accompanying notes 139-99.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 230-61.
27. See, e.g., EEOC v. City of Linton, 623 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Inc. 1985) (holding employer
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of judges who treat the judiciary as "'a stepping stone to a lucrative private
practice."' 28 On more than one occasion, judges have encountered a barrage of
criticism when they chose to leave office and accept employment with private
firms only a short time after ruling in favor of those firms's clients.29
Regardless of whether or not the judge's subsequent employment was a quid
pro quo for the favorable ruling, the judge's actions raised an impermissible
appearance of bias.
By drawing upon simple economic behavior theory, Part VI shows that
mandatory retirement policies create the same potential for bias or the
appearance of bias that troubles Justice Rehnquist. The policies forcejudges to
vacate the bench at an age when many would prefer continued employment. As
a result, the policies either tempt, or appear to tempt, judges to decide cases for
or against a particular litigant in order to possibly obtain future favors,
employment, or other consideration from the litigant. The structure of the legal
order with its differential posture on appellate review and widespread
indeterminacy of legal principles on most matters, gives these trial judges and
appellate judges ample room within which they can engage in biased decision
making. This potential is magnified because objectively correct decisions are
rarely identifiable, and the judge's ruling will stand absent clear error.3" For
these reasons, although mandatory retirement may initially appear to be
acceptable because it eliminates the need for impeachment in reality it is
wholly unacceptable, for it undermines the state's interest in independent
adjudication, free from all appearance of bias.
In a judicial system that must avoid not only misbehavior but also the
appearance of misbehavior, mandatory retirement policies threaten to
undermine all of our system's basic values. When viewed in this light, a court
has no reason to agree with a state's preference for mandatory retirement, and
the impracticability prong of the BFOQ test should not be satisfied."
28. EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, WHY JUDGES RESIGN:
INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE, 1789 TO 1992,40 (1993).
29. See id. at 16-17; see also infra text accompanying notes 277-79 (noting criticisms that
arise when judges leave the bench for private practice).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 275-76.
31. Although this Article is designed to support attacks on mandatory retirement policies
on state law grounds, the materials cited herein sometimes draw upon federal courts'
interpretations of the ADEA. On the one hand, many state anti-discrimination laws are modeled
afterthe ADEA, and courts have construed state provisions in accordance with similar provisions
in the federal statute. See, e.g., Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1360 (N.D. Iowa 1995);
Smith v. K-Mart Corp., 899 F. Supp. 503, 506 (E.D. Wash. 1995); Winston v. Me. Tech. Col.
Sys., 631 A.2d 70, 74-75 (Me. 1993); N.C. Dep't of Corr. v. Gibson, 301 S.E.2d 78, 83 (N.C.
1983); Grimmwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, 753 P.2d 517,520 (Wash. 1988). But on the other
hand, state courts are unconstrained by federal interpretations and are free to pursue their own
courses of action. The Supreme Court's recent holding in Kimel v. Fla. State Bd. ofRegents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000), that the Eleventh Amendment bars application of the ADEA to state employers
2000]
7
McFadden: Judical Independence, Age-Based BFOQs, and the Perils of Mandator
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52: 81
Mandatory retirement policies are outdated relics of a more intolerant era, and
they have no place in modem society. Unless state legislatures expressly
exempt their appointed state judges from their state's laws against age
discrimination, courts should find the mandatory retirement policies invalid.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MANDATORY
RETIREMENT POLICIES
As noted earlier, at least thirty states have policies prescribing mandatory
retirement ages for appointed state courtjudges. 2 These retirement policies are
found in state constitutions or have been enacted by statute.33 Most states have
preserved the same retirement ages for dozens of years, if not more. Whether
it is New Hamshire (whose retirement age of 70 has been around since 1792)y'
or Ohio (which in 1968 became one of the most recent states to require
mandatory retirement),3 states have consistently refused to upwardly adjustthe
ages to keep pace with concurrent advances in human life expectancies.
3 6
Historical materials do little to explain why seventy is seen as a magic
number. Most justifications are little more than stereotypes. For example, in
Nelson v. Mille?-7 the Supreme Court of Utah pointed to absolutely no evidence
that seventy-year-old judges perform their essential job functions less capably
than their younger colleagues. Nevertheless, the courtupheld the determination
of the legislature because it felt that "in the society of today mandatory
retirement has become a way of life."38 In O'Neil v. Baine39 the Supreme Court
further underscores the freedom that public bodies have to develop their own rules covering
workplace age discrimination. Thus, in the post-Kimel world, this Article's analysis should be
viewed as a guidepost, allowing for state-by-state adjustments where necessary, rather than a
definite plan of attack.
Two additional points are also worth noting. First, if a state's age discrimination statute
conflicted with a mandatory retirement provision, courts would have to determine whether the
statutes could be read in harmony or if one would necessarily trump the other. This Article
presents arguments that would support granting greater weight to the state's anti-discrimination
law; however, state courts would be free to reject this analysis. Second, because the argument
in this Article is based on statutory construction, it could become moot if the legislature were to
redraft an anti-discrimination statute out of disagreement with the ruling of the judiciary. This
is the nature of statutory interpretation, however, regardless of the issue at stake. The materials
presented in this Article are nonetheless relevant to any conceptual, textual, and theoretical
discussion of this topic.
32. See sources cited supra note 10.
33. See sources cited supra note 10.
34. See Grinnel v. State, 435 A.2d 523, 525 (N.H. 1981).
35. See State ex reL Keefe v. Eyrich, 489 N.E.2d 259,260 (Ohio 1986).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 163-65 (discussing changes in life expectancy and
mortality rates).
37. 480 P.2d 467 (Utah 1971).
38. Id. at 473.
39. 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
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of Missouri similarly upheld the state mandatory retirement law, without regard
to the plaintiffjudge's ability, on the grounds that "age seventy is an age-a
time of life-which is recognized by society as being 'about' the time when the
physical and mental processes weaken among many men and women."4
Of course, prevailing social norms alone will not defeat a claim based on
age discrimination law. Courts have repeatedly held that employers must
present a factual basis for claiming that employees can no longer perform their
essential job functions once they reach a certain age.4' The lack of any factual
basis for mandatory retirement policies is why they have been eliminated in so
many areas under which the ADEA extends coverage, and why they cannot be
rightfully applied to appointed state court judges.42
But even if supporters of mandatory retirement policies could offer
satisfactory explanations about why they have chosen any particular retirement
age, the next step would be to analyze why states claim the policies are
necessary to facilitate effective judging. States offer three basic reasons. First,
they argue that mandatory retirement maintains public confidence in the
judiciary by eliminating the need for impeachment hearings of incompetent
elderly judges. Supporters of this argument allege that such hearings damage
the public's perception ofthe judiciary by raising doubts about the integrity and
fitness of all judges.43 Second, states argue that mandatory retirement policies
promote justice by allowing for the appointment of younger judges who are
more representative of the state's prevailing demographics and mores.' Finally,
states argue that the policies advance judicial economy by allowing for
continuous, efficient retirement and replacement of appointed judges.4" In
essence, states which support mandatory retirement policies contend that the
policies minimize public censure ofthejudiciary, allow judges to keep with the
times and maximize efficiency.
Because generalized retirement policies are offered as alternatives to an
individualized assessment of each judge's fitness and competence, they should
be analyzed within the framework of the BFOQ exception to a state's age
discrimination law. However, none of the justifications in support of the
policies are sufficiently compelling to warrant invoking the BFOQ exception
for they fail to accommodate the judiciary's unique role within our society as
a counter-majoritarian institution.46 As this Article explains in later detail, such
justifications are premised upon notions of efficiency or are designed to
40. Id at 767.
41. See, e.g., W. Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985) (holding that
employer must show factual basis for belief of necessity of age-based employment criteria).
42. See infra Part IV.C.
43. See infra Part IV.B.1.
44. See infra Part IV.B.2.
45. See infra Part IV.B.3.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91, 95-143.
2000]
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appease the public generally. Thus, the justifications threaten to undermine the
core values of the judicial system, which are protected only through the use of
cumbersome, and often inefficient, checks and balances designed to eliminate
all aspects of public opinion from consideration.47 If judges are to remain
independent, avoid the appearance of impropriety, and foster the values that
litigants place in the judicial system, then policies such as mandatory
retirement, which is primarily designed to enhance the judiciary's
representativeness and efficiency, must be rejected. The costs flowing from
such policies overwhelmingly outweigh any benefits derived from them. 8
III. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE "POLICYMAKER" EXCEPTION
State laws against age discrimination usually exempt from coverage any
employee who is "an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the
office."49 Policymakers must typically function at the "highest levels of the
departments or agencies" within the state." In order to avoid what it felt were
potential Tenth Amendment problems, the Supreme Court in Gregory v.
Ashcrof5 ' broadly construed the definition of "policymaker" to exempt state
judges from ADEA protection. 2 Essentially, the Court was worried that
extending the ADEA to state judges would have allowed for Congress to
legislate in a sensitive area of particular state concern. Such a result, the Court
felt, might have upset the balance of power in federal-state relations. 3
Federalism concerns are not raised, however, when a state court interprets
its own statutes. Not only is the issue uncomplicated by federal intervention,
but the state courts are determining how their own legislature has addressed an
issue of particular state concern. Here, judicial review vindicates state
sovereignty by seeking to give full effect to a state's compelling interest in
eradicating age discrimination in employment. It is not problematic for state
courts to determine that the "policymaking" exception in a state's age
discrimination law has a different meaning than what the Supreme Court
concluded Congress meant when it used a similar term in the ADEA. Different
47. See infra text accompanying notes 72-91.
48. See infra Parts IV-VI.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1994).
50. Sciocchetti, supra note 20, at 878.
51. 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 457-70. For the views of the Gregory petitioners' counsel of record on this
issue, see Bruce Dayton Livingston, Gregory v. Ashcroft: The Supreme CourtAnnounces a New
Rule of Statutory Construction in Deference to Constitutionally Recognized Principles of
Federalism, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 243 (1992) (presenting the views of the Gregory
petitioners' counsel on this issue).
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statutory interpretations are expected and anticipated given our nation's system
of dual sovereignty.
Dual sovereignty is based on the premise that states will serve as
"laboratories of democracy" and will respond to unique local concerns in away
that Congress, with its more national focus, is comparatively less equipped to
do.54 Such a system of government exists to encourage innovation and
experimentation among states.55 If courts construing state statutes merely
incorporate the reasoning of federal courts in interpreting similar federal
statutes and all state legislators simply follow the lead of Congress when
writing them, then the principal benefits of dual federalism will remain
unrealized. Indeed, as Justice Brennan once commented, differences of opinion
between federal and state courts "present no threat to enforcement of national
standards .... Nor should these developments be greeted with dismay by
conservatives; the state laboratories are once again open for business.""6
While the Gregory Court ultimately held that judges are "policymakers"
as defined by Congress in the ADEA,57 a more reasoned analysis, freed from
the politics of federalism, should inescapably counsel against the conclusion
that appointed state judges are policymakers within state agencies or
departments. The analysis should begin with the words of the statute itself. As
a matter of plain language, almost every action could be considered
"policymaking," for a "policy" is broadly defined as a "definite course or
method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given
conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions."58
Commentators have noted that unless this exception for policymakers is to
render age discrimination laws meaningless, it should be limited in application
only to those appointed officials who are policymakers first and foremost.5 9 If
a state adopted this limited construction of"policymakers," it might reasonably
apply only to elected officials, administrative agents, close advisors, staff
members, and others relied upon by such elected officials to implement and
develop their programmatic proposals.
54. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (coining expression "laboratories of democracy").
55. See id.
56. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 550 (1986); see also
Christopher R. McFadden, The Wisconsin Bear Arms Amendment and the Case Against an
Absolute Prohibition on Carrying Concealed Weapons, 19N. ILL.U. L.REv. 709,719-23 (1999)
(analyzing legislative history and arguing that state constitution amendment should not be
interpreted with reference to similar provision in federal constitution).
57. 501 U.S. at 464-67; 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1994) ("The term 'employee' means ... an
appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office.").
58. WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 910 (1987).
59. See Sciocchetti, supra note 20, at 873-82.
2000]
11
McFadden: Judical Independence, Age-Based BFOQs, and the Perils of Mandator
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Should judges be included on such a list? One might argue that judges
serving on a state supreme court are policymakers because they exercise
supervisory and administrative powers over lower courts. This definition is
more narrow than that adopted in Gregory, it would protect lower-ranking
judges from age discrimination, but not their higher-ranking brethren.
Nevertheless, there is no legitimate reason for adopting such a definition. The
most obvious problem is that the policymaking exception, under state statutes
patterned after the ADEA, was specifically intended to embrace only those
policymakers working within "departments or agencies."' Departments and
agencies are commonly associated with the executive branch of government,
not the judicial branch.6'
Moreover, despite the fact that some appointed state supreme courtjudges
exercise supervisory and administrative powers, their primary job function is
to adjudicate cases and controversies. Other duties are additional or ancillary.62
A definition of a "policymaker" as a public servant with any degree of
administrative authority has no logical stopping point, for within every agency
that makes policy every employee plays some role in developing and
implementing that policy. For example, imagine a state utility commission with
an appointed regulatory commissioner and a civil service system of hiring and
promoting. Unless the commissioner makes and executes each decision
herself-which is an extremely unlikely proposition given the scope and
complexity of the modem administrative state-the commissioner will delegate
authority to the agency's employees. They will then delegate responsibility to
their underlings and so forth. No doubt, every significant employee within the
agency fulfills numerous other job functions that are not directly related to
implementing policy. Yet, if we are to subscribe to the notion that every
employee who has a hand in policy development is a policymaker, then the
entire civil service should be exempted from all state age discrimination laws.
This chain of events has never come to fruition in any state across the country,
and no court has ever required it. The inference, therefore, is that employees
who engage in some degree of policymaking should not be considered
"policymakers" unless the policymaking is an essential job function. Because
there is no principled reason for finding appointed state judges to be
"policymakers" while finding non-judicial employees in similar circumstances
60. Id. at 878.
61. See, e.g., Schabarum v. Cal. Leg., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(observing that administrative agencies are a part of the executive branch).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 139-54 (discussing need for narrow definition of
"essential job functions"). But cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957)
("Separation of powers ... is not mandatory in state governments.").
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to be fully protected from age discrimination, such an interpretation of
"policymaker" should not stand.63
Some courts have gone even one step further. Rather than viewing judges
as employees who occasionally and indirectly exercise nominal administrative
power, these courts have ruled that the principal duties of state judges are
policymaking ones." This is because judges supposedly rely on policy when
interpreting statutes or filling in gaps in legislation, and such decisions
involving statutory interpretation may have political implications. As a matter
of reality, this argument has some merit. The legal realist critique of the
classical legal tradition has laid bare the myth that legal principles can be
deduced through categorical reasoning and abstract logical formalism. Since
the days of its pioneer, Karl Llewlyn, legal realism has placed a premium on
legal analysis in terms of public policy, ethical, and institutional concerns. Its
influence has permeated legal discourse, with the result that many today view
the law in terms of its social consequences and recognize its instrumental
power to shape society. 65 According to Professor Singer, "we are all realists
now,' 366 and judges surely are no exception.
But while judges may be legal realists, it does not follow that they should
be classified as policymakers. When judges interpret statutes, they do so not as
authors and creators of policy, but as reviewers of policies already established
by the legislative and executive branches. As the Second Circuit held in EEOC
v. Vermont 7 when it considered the essence of the judicial function, "The
63. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars
application of the ADEA to state government employees and thereby shifts responsibility for
protecting those employees to the states themselves. See Kimel v. Fla. St. Bd. of Regents, 120
S.Ct. 631,650 (2000). Protection can arise only under each individual state's anti-discrimination
laws. Thus, the Kimel decision makes clear the relevance of this Article to contemporary
discourse concerning the proper scope of state employer-employee legislation.
64. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1990), af'd, 501 U.S.
452 (1991); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52,55 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F.
Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Apkin v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 517 N.E.2d 141, 143 n.5
(Mass. 1988); In re Stout, 559 A.2d 489, 496 (Pa. 1989).
65. There is abundant discussion of the American legal realist movement. Some excellent
general materials include AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz
& Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
EMPiRucAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); Note, Legal Realism and the Race Question: Some Realism
About Realism on Race Relations, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1607-11 (1995). Cf MORTON J.
HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 10-30 (1992) (discussing basic principles and tenets of classical legal
jurisprudence).
66. Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 467 (1988).
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principal business of the courts is the resolution of disputes... ."" According
to the court:
In some cases, the courts resolve those disputes merely by
applying established legal principles; in others, they must
determine what legal principles apply when there is a lacuna
in the law or determine how seemingly conflicting legal
principles are to be reconciled. Even in the latter type of case,
however, the courts are called upon primarily to fathom the
nature and contours of the policies established by the
legislative and executive branches rather than to create or
fashion new policy. Though such ajudicial decision may thus
state or clarify policy, any such statement or clarification is
merely ancillary to the resolution of a particular controversy
between parties.69
The Second Circuit correctly recognized that legal clarifications take place
in accordance with constitutional mandates or legislative decrees.7" The notion
that ajudge acts effectively as a legislator or an executive is wholly contrary
to the framers' understanding of the judiciary.7' While a judge has certain
discretionary authority, her foremost consideration is to effectuate the spirit and
intent of the legislature. 2 Long ago, Alexander Hamilton argued in The
Federalist Papers that "[tihe courts must declare the sense of the law" and
must not substitute "will instead of judgment."73 The principle that the
legislature makes laws and thejudiciary hears controversies arising under them
is fundamental to our entire system of separation of powers. According to
James Madison, "'Were the power ofjudging joined with the legislative, the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the
judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.""'"
68. Id. at 800.
69. Id. at 800-01.
70. Id. at 800.
71. THEFEDERALISTNO. 47, at 338 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
72. See, e.g., Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating a court
must look to legislative intent when interpreting statutes); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 16 (1997) (discussing principle that "the
judge's objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to 'the intent of the legislature'); Id.
at 16-41 (advocating a textualist approach towards statutory interpretation).
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 493 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Judges do not write the laws, and they are not free to transform the laws
beyond what they already are. Moreover, "the judiciary derives no logical or
moral authority to invalidate the actions of the majoritarian branches on
grounds other than inconsistency with constitutional dictates."75 Because there
is no judicial role in authoring the policy in the first instance, there is no
legitimate basis for holding thatjudges are policymakers. Logic and experience
both counsel against such a definition.76
Admittedly, one could argue thatjudges "make laws" when they expound
upon their state's common law. Even H.L.A. Hart, one of the leading modem
positivists, has recognized that adjudication can involve choosing among legal
precedents that are "indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an
open texture."' In deciding these cases, Hart argues, the judge must determine
which rule best fits the given situation by "striking a balance, in the light of
circumstances, between competing interests" 78 -a process that is strikingly
analogous to legislating.79 But even if one adopts this starkly political definition
of common-law judging, one need not agree that judges are policymakers. To
the contrary, it remains quite reasonable to maintain that common-law judges
are merely effectuating the community's inarticulate yet preexisting,
universally held values and standards."0 Indeed, Professor Eisenberg writes that
75. Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review:
The Role of TextualAnalysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1987).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
77. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (1961).
78. Id. at 132.
79. The language of the New York Court of Appeals in Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691
(N.Y. 1951), provides an appropriate example of the recognition of common-law judicial
discretion. In creating a tort action for children who suffered fetal injuries, the court stated:
Of course, rules of law on which men rely in their business dealings should
not be changed in the middle of the game, but what has that to do with
bringing to justice a tort-feasor... ? Negligence law is common law, and
the common law has been molded and changed and brought up-to-date in
many another case .... [Wihile legislative bodies have the power to
change old rules of law, nevertheless, when theyfail to act, it is the duty of
the court to bring the law into accordance with present day standards of
wisdom andjustice rather than"with some outworn and antiquated rule of
the past."
Id. at 694 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also William E. Nelson, The Integrity of the
Judiciary in Twentieth-Century New York, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 18-22 (1998) (discussing
impact of legal realist movement upon New York Court of Appeals decisions).
80. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 151-54 (1988)
(noting that judges pronounce common law in light of pre-existing doctrine and social norms).
Professor Eisenberg believes that common-law rules must conform to what he has described as
the standards of social congruence, systemic consistency, and doctrinal stability. See id. at 43-49.
For early American debates about the role of the common law in a democratic republic, see
STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY,
178-200 (3d ed., 1995) and materials therein.
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ajudge's ruling will be "so drained of normativity that it will have little or no
legal or moral force" unless it conforms to the community's endogenous codes
of conduct."'
Moreover, in pronouncing the common law, the judge's ruling in a
particular case binds no one beyond the individual litigants.82 The decision can
never become a general rule of law if the legislature preempts it with a contrary
statutory mandate. Thus, the legislature always remains in control of
lawmaking, and courts have power only to adjudicate particular cases and
controversies. Given that the Constitution's framers nonetheless viewed the
judiciary as a non-legislative branch,83 there is no obvious reason to classify
common-law judges as policymakers under today's age discrimination laws.
84
Above all, if the policymaking exception is to remain a narrow one, it
should be limited "to deny protection from age discrimination only to
policymaking appointees working closely with, and held accountable to, the
officials who appointed them."8 5 According to one commentator, "Judges are
appointed by elected officials, but do not collaborate or work closely with
them, and are in no way answerable to them."86 Courts act as a constitutional
check against the illegitimate acts of the majoritarian branches, and judges can
perform this duty only by asserting their independent judgment. As a result,
while elected officials and appointed judges both work within the same
tripartite government, their purposes often conflict. Certainly, judges do not
work closely with elected officials to implement the officials' overall
goals-that type of activity is decidedly executive in nature.
One travels down a dangerous road by designating judges as policymakers.
Alexander Hamilton remarked that the judiciary, which lacks any power to
enforce its judgments, is the "weakest of the three departments of power" and
81. EISENBERG, supra note 80, at 153.
82. The rule of stare decisis counsels that the underlying principle of the decision should
remain binding, but subsequent courts can distinguish or distance the application of the principle
to particular cases. See SCALIA, supra note 72, at 7 (discussing the evolution of common law).
In that sense, the ruling is essentially an individual order rather than a rule with generalized
applicability. See generally GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATnVE LAW 10-21 (1998)
(explaining differences between rules and orders in the context of administrative law). A rule
"functions in most ways like a statute" and has general applicability and future effect. Id. at 10.
An order applies to discrete, identifiable groups of individuals and "functions in most ways like
a court judgment," generally resolving only the issue presented in a particular case. Id. at 10-Il.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
84. Moreover, common-law judging is but one of the judge's multitude of duties. The
judge also determines matters of public, private, and constitutional law. Any expansion of the
term "policymaker" beyond reference to true legislators could easily be stretched to include
almost any governmental employee, thereby obliterating what is supposed to be a narrow
exception to the general prohibition against age discrimination. See supra text accompanying
notes 62-63.
85. Sciocchetti, supra note 20, at 879.
86. Id. at 882.
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is "in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its
coordinate branches."' 7 The judiciary is able to render impartial opinions and
to command the respect of the coordinate branches of government, which are
called upon to give court opinions force and effect-only because the judiciary
remains truly distinct and independent of the other branches.8" Viewing the
judiciary as an administrative functionary rather than a separate branch of
government threatens its integrity by blurring its special institutional role and
structure. Its decisions lose their moral force and, hence, their legitimacy. If
judges are policymakers subservient to the political branches, how can they
command the prestige necessary to check the exercise of majoritarian will in
excess of constitutional power? And ifjudges are not truly independent, then
who will judge the judges?
Viewing judges as policymakers also degrades the legislative and
executive branches by implying that an unelected, unaccountable judiciary can
perform the manifestly political functions reserved for those branches most
directly responsible to the public will. As a result, the legislature's own
authority might be undermined, or, on the other hand, the legislature might
choose to delegate large chunks of decisionmaking authority to the judiciary
rather than make the decisions itself, particularly on controversial issues. In
either situation, either the legislature or the judiciary would enjoy less
autonomy and command less respect. The Constitution's carefully chosen and
crafted system of tripartite government would effectively be dismantled.
The preceding formalistic interpretation of the separation of powers
doctrine is susceptible to criticism by scholars who hold more functionalist
views.89 A typical attack would be similar to Professor Alfange's argument that
formal separation of powers theories "severely hinder the quest for'a workable
government' with no appreciable gain for the cause of liberty or efficiency."'
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Hamilton continued:
'IThere is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers'.... [L]iberty can have nothing to fear
from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union
with either of the other departments ....
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution.
Id. (citation omitted).
88. See Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the Scope of
Article III: The Troubling Cases ofMorison and Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 299, 302-03
(1990).
89. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to Govern ": The Needfor
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DuKE L.J. 449, 477-78, 490-505
(1991) (detailing and critiquing alternative models of separation of powers).
90. Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome
Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 670 (1990); see also Rebecca L. Brown,
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1525 (1991) (asserting
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Such criticism, however, overlooks that it is impossible to predict precisely at
what point the intermingling of the various branches would undermine
fundamental political values of government. The danger to liberty would be
incremental-eventually the judicial branch either would have acquired an
excess of authority or would have lost much of its requisite integrity.
Responsibility for the overall harm could not be attributed to any single branch.
Yet it is for this very reason that prophylactic separation of powers protections
exist in the first place. They are designed to prevent damage to the political
framework before serious harm can occur. According to Professor Redish,
"[T]o criticize formalism for producing overly mechanical results or for failing
to produce recognizable gains misses the point of the preventive methodology
inherent in our separation of powers theory."'" No one knows when the
protections will be needed, but they can never contribute to the defense of the
political order once they are gone.
It bears repeating that a state legislature could expressly exempt appointed
judges from age discrimination laws. Such an exemption would contradict the
expressed state interest in avoiding workplace discrimination, but would not
have the additional costs which might accompany a judicial decision that
defines judges as policymakers. Yet, by this point, it should be clear that
precisely because of the logistical and practical dangers inherent in such a
definition, the BFOQ's "policymaking" exception should not be construed to
include appointed state judges. If a state were to press forth with its mandatory
retirement policy in the face of a concurrent age discrimination law, it should
have to prove that age is a BFOQ reasonably necessary to judicial
decisionmaking and that other means of removing individual judges, such as
impeachment, are impractical. Part IV explains that this cannot be done.
IV. BFOQ ANALYSIS: THE ESSENCE OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION AND THE
RELEVANCE OF AGE
A state must satisfy both prongs of the BFOQ test to successfully invoke
the "policymaking" exception. First, the state must show that "'the essence of
the business operation would be undermined"' if it did not make employment
decisions based on age. 2 Second, the state must show (1) that members of the
affected class are unable to perform the job, or that "it is 'impossible or highly
separatio'i of powers "tends to produce excessively mechanical results"); Lloyd N. Cutler, To
Forma Government, in SEPARATIONOFPOWERS-DoEsITSTILLWORK? 1, 1 (RobertA. Goldwin
& Art Kaufman eds., 1986) (claiming that separation of powers inhibits government's ability to
"propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing").
91. Redish & Cisar, supra note 89, at 477.
92. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Diaz
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)).
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impractical' to deal with the older employees on an individualized basis"; and
(2) that a generalized mandatory retirement policy is a more acceptable
alternative.
94
In order to help determine the "essence" of the judicial function, this Part
begins by considering the underlying values and norms of the judicial system.
After all, without a clear understanding of the judiciary's role in society, we
cannot determine ajudge's essential duties. Subpart A of this Part explains that
the essence of the judicial function is to adjudicate matters independently and
free from the appearance of bias and examines important aspects of judicial
decisionmaking as well as threats to this function. Having defined the judicial
function in Subpart A, Subpart B shows how several public policy justifications
used by some courts in upholding mandatory retirement policies have actually
undermined the values discussed in Subpart A. These justifications either
misinterpret the plain meaning and intent of age discrimination laws or
compromise thejudiciary's counter-majoritarian institutional role. In any event,
regardless of the justification one chooses, Subpart C suggests that
youthfulness is not reasonably necessary for accurate judging and thus, under
the first prong of the BFOQ analysis, the essence of the business operation
would not be undermined if the state employer did not make employment
decisions based on age.
A. The First Prong: Defining the "Essence" of The Judicial Power and
Its "Reasonably Necessary" Qualifications
An occupational qualification is not essential to the operation of a business
unless it is necessary in all situations.95 This Article defines the essence of the
judicial power as the independent adjudication of cases and controversies free
from the appearance of bias.' Such a definition recognizes that a judge does
93. W. Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,414 (1985) (quoting Tamiami, 531 F.2d at
235).
94. See, e.g., EEOC v. City of Linton, 623 F. Supp. 724, 726 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (stating that
an employer must prove there was "no acceptable alternative" to better advance the employer's
goal); see also infra text accompanying notes 256-94 (discussing effects of generalized
mandatory retirement policies). This second requirement-that the generalized policy be more
acceptable than individual analysis-is often overlooked, yet is crucial to this Article's
discussion ofmandatory retirement policies. Therefore, Part VI is reserved for a fuller discussion
of this requirement.
95. See 1 HOWARD C. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 5.05, at 5-22 (2d ed. 1997).
96. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial power shall extend to all
Cases... [and] to Controversies .... "); see also United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445
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more than simply make decisions; ajudge must make them in a certain way.97
No one could maintain that a judge who bases her rulings on racism, for
example, or in exchange for a $200 bribe, is fulfilling her duties acceptably.
Such a judge would not fulfill one or more of the following three essential
values that litigants place in the judicial system: (1) seeing a case decided
accurately and acceptably; (2) participating in the decisionmaking process; and
(3) receiving an equal opportunity to present their case.9" The realization of
these three values all depends entirely on ajudge's impartiality and ability to
avoid the appearance of bias in her decisionmaking.
1. Judging Independently and Free from the Appearance of Bias
a. Resolving Cases Accurately andAcceptably
A judge must act independently and avoid the appearance of bias in her
rulings if the parties are to realize their interests in receiving a fair and accurate
ruling. Various commentators have argued that essentially a trial is a search for
the truth, and all of the procedural safeguards and truthseeking devices of a trial
are wasted if the judge bases her findings on factors other than the evidence
presented. 9 But even if thejudge reaches an accurate result, the Supreme Court
has recognized that she neither "satisf[ies] the appearance of justice"'' "0 nor
"generate[s] the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has
been done"'0' if either party has reasonable doubts about her independence.
Regardless of whether any particular judge can resist the temptation to allow
personal interests to sway the resolution of a dispute, the perception-of-fairness
value demands that the judge be enjoined from deciding a case if she has even
the slightest identifiable potential bias.
For instance, imagine a rape trial in which certain pieces of evidence were
vigorously disputed. Imagine further that the victim was the judge's sister.
Their familial relationship could help further accuracy interests, for it would
97. Courts have long recognized that ajob's essence may include a requirement that it be
performed in a certain manner. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,
388 (5th Cir. 1971) (asserting that the essence of aviation industry is to "transport passengers
safely from one point to another").
98. See generally Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, AdjudicatoryIndependence
and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475-91 (1986) (discussing
multiple values inherent in our judicial system).
99. See id. at 476 ("According to the instrumental conception of due process, the purpose
of the clause is to ensure the most accurate decision possible. The due process protections such
as notice, hearing, and right to counsel are valuable because they contribute to the goal of
accuracy.").
100. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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give the judge a clearer insight into the various aspects of the sister's lifestyle,
background, and behavior that might be in dispute. However, even if the judge
carefully weighed the evidence, treated both parties equally, and allowed each
party to speak its mind before finding the defendant guilty, it is unlikely that the
defendant would feel he had received a fair trial. Regardless of the accuracy of
the ruling, the parties could not know whether it was based on the evidence or
the judge's biases."
Few situations more severely threaten trust in the judicial process than the
perception that a litigant never had a chance because the decisionmaker may
have owed the other side special favors. Indeed, the panoply of restrictions that
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct imposes on judges are all based upon the
premise thatjudges must not hear cases in any situation when their impartiality
might reasonably be questioned-even if the judge is not biased in fact. 03
Moreover, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed
the need for such prophylactic rules designed to minimize the appearance of
bias. When the Court considered a challenge to rules regarding disqualification
ofjudges, it explained that such "stringent rule[s] may sometimes bar trial by
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high
function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice." '
In other words, judicial independence and an absence of improper
appearances are both necessary to exercise the judicial function properly, yet
neither is sufficient alone. No judge can fulfill her essential job functions if
there are doubts about her independence. When there is doubt about thejudge's
impartiality, then not even the most elaborate procedural safeguards-such as
notice, opportunity for comment, cross examination, and the litigants' ability
to choose their own attorney-will satisfy concerns of the public about having
cases decided accurately and acceptably.
102. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(13) (1999) ("Ajudge shall not
allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or
judgment."); id. Canon 3(E) (requiring judge to disqualify herself if she has economic or
personal bias in the matter); see also In re Kading, 235 N.W.2d 409,418 (Wis. 1975) (upholding
family-based conflict of interest rules imposed on state judges because "a judge would be just
as likely to lose his impartiality if his spouse or children owned assets which would be materially
affected by the outcome of a case, as he would if he himself owned those assets").
103. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1999) (placing many restrictions
upon judges). See also Christopher R. McFadden, Comment, Integrity, Accountability, and
Efficiency: UsingDisclosure to Fight the Appearance ofNepotism inSchoolBoardContracting,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 657,669-71 (2000) (discussing the importance of minimizing the appearance
of impropriety in government).
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b. Participation in the Decisionmaking Process
A judge who is biased or appears to be biased also jeopardizes the judge's
own ability to promote the goal of participation." 5 Professor Michelman
explains that "the individual may have various reasons for wanting the
opportunity to discuss the decision with the agent."'" He continues:
Some pertain to external consequences: the individual might
succeed in persuading the agent away from the harmful
action. But again a participatory opportunity may also be
psychologically important to the individual: to have played
a part in, to have made one's apt contribution to, decisions
which are about oneself may be counted important even
though the decision, as it turns out, is the most unfavorable
one imaginable and one's efforts have not proved
influential. °7
Aside from this psychological benefit, Michelman also sees a societal
benefit in participation. Allowing an individual to participate in the
proceedings, he argues, counters the perception of secrecy or self-interest in
government." 8
Michelman's emphasis on participation only makes sense, though, if one
assumes that the individual harbors some hope of bringing about substantive
change in the judge's action or attitude. The ability to persuade, in turn,
presupposes the existence of a persuadable decisionmaker to take account of
the individual's arguments and concerns. Imagine asituation in which thejudge
announces pre-trial that she has absolutely made up her mind on the merits of
the case and will not reconsider her decision. Does participation in this instance
afford any meaningful opportunity for persuasion? What is gained by allowing
for participation after the decision has been effectively made? Perhaps there is
societal benefit in letting individuals vent their frustrations. Yet to the degree
this interest is recognized, it is done in a context in which the litigants almost
certainly are unaware that they are merely letting off steam. Thus, the litigants
are misled into believing they have a participatory role, when in reality they do
not. They are not communicating with thejudge so much as talking to thejudge
105. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). The Supreme Court has
characterized the "two central concerns of procedural due process" as "the prevention of
unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion ofparticipation and dialogue by affected
individuals in the decisionmaking process." Id.
106. Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in
DuE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII 126, 127 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
107. Id. at 127-28.
108. See id. at 126-28.
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or at the judge. There is no reason to believe that, at the end of the day, the
litigants will have developed any positive feelings towards the judicial system
or disposed of any feelings about the judge's own secretive, self-interested
tendencies.
Even as Michelman defines the participatory value, participation means
"full and frank interchange,"' 9 and thus focuses on the litigant's opportunity
to inform the judge in the hopes of changing her decision. While it cannot be
said that ajudge's perceived bias precludes any chance ofpersuadingthejudge,
persuasion is certainly far less likely. A system that values participation cannot
be squared with a judge who is not truly independent. Indeed, the Court has
recognized that the "requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings
safeguards . . . the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected
individuals in the decisionmaking process. ' 0
Clearly, an individual cannot fully realize the value of participation in a
legal system based on persuasion when ajudge appears biased or prejudiced.
Conversely, a judge with an apparently open mind leaves each litigant
believing that her claim will receive some degree of thoughtful reflection,
regardless of the eventual ruling. Thus, an independent adjudicator-both in
appearance and in fact-is essential to the adversary system. An independent
adjudicator helps insure that each litigant will receive at least a minimal amount
of meaningful attention and consideration.
c. Equality Among Litigants
Finally, ajudge must avoid all hints of bias if she is to promote equality.
According to Professor Mashaw, equality dictates that "the techniques for
making collective decisions not imply that one person's or group's
contribution-facts, interpretation, policy argument, etc.-is entitled to greater
respectthan another's merely because of the identity of the person or group."'
A judge who seems to reflexively credit police testimony over the words of a
criminal, for example, or who requires all minorities to sit at the back of the
courtroom, violates this norm. Professor Summers has also discussed this norm,
insisting that the question of procedural fairness (or equality) is wholly separate
from the question of who wins or loses."' He explains:
109. Id. at 128.
110. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 (1980) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,259-62,266-
67(1978)).
III. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Questfor a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U. L. REv. 885, 899 (1981).
112. Robert S. Summers, Evaluatingand ImprovingLegal Processes-A Pleafor"Process
Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 25 (1974).
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[A]n adjudicator might choose to hear only one side.., via
both oral and written briefs, but the other [side] via only
written briefs.... Whether the advantaged party wins or
loses, the procedure itself is unfair, for the adjudicator does
not accord equal procedural rights to parties similarly situated
in relevant respects.'
Summers' argument, however, begs the question: Why are parties
concerned about this procedure unless it is symptomatic of deeper unfair or
irrational biases, which, in turn, might alter the case's outcome? To be sure, a
broadly defined interest in equality pervades all rules governing society,
ranging from the general edict, "do unto others as you would have done unto
you," to the more specifically tailored prohibitions against workplace
discrimination. To the extent that equality has special value within the judicial
system, Professors Redish and Marshall have commented that "equality would
seem to be part of a broader concern for reaching an accurate result."'"14 Just as
an irrational adjudicator undermines equality, an independent, unbiased
adjudicator facilitates it. Redish and Marshall have concluded, "Use of a non-
independent adjudicator represents the essence of procedural inequality: even
if the parties are equally afforded every other procedural protection, the most
rudimentary equality cannot be achieved if the adjudicator is subject to
irrational factors that skew her decisionmaking towards one of the litigants."'"5
Put another way, the decisionmaking process is meaningless unless each
litigant has an equal opportunity to argue before a judge who avoids all
impropriety and appearance of impropriety. Only through true independence
can a judge foster the goals of equality, participation, and accurate
decisionmaking.
2. Threats to Judicial Independence andthe Appearance ofFairness
For purposes of a BFOQ analysis, the question is: What threatens a
judge's independence or raises the appearance of bias? Old age, as explained
in later detail, does not. 16 A judge's potential financial interest in a case,
however, most certainly does. No man is to be ajudge in his own cause. This
rule has been an essential tenet of the common law for nearly four centuries. As
early as 1610, in the famous Dr. Bonham's Case,"7 Lord Coke held that a
113. Id.; see also id. at 21-22 (discussing value of equality to due process calculus).
114. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 98, at 485.
115. Id.
116. See inffra text accompanying notes 174-80, 200-24 (affirming that old age is not
related to decline in judicial ability).
117. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).
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statute did not allow ajudicial body to receive one-half of the fine it assessed
against the defendant." I8 Lord Coke construed the statute narrowly to reach this
result because, had he not, it would have been "against common right and
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed."
'" 9
The principle that ajudge may not serve two masters, especially if one is
economic self-interest, supports the lifetime tenure and salary provisions of our
federal constitution2" and provided the basis for the Supreme Court's holding
in Tumey v. Ohio121-the first American decision on the necessary conditions
of judicial independence. In Tumey the Court overturned the conviction of a
man who had been found guilty of liquor possession by Mayor Pugh of North
College Hill, Ohio, who was serving a dual role as mayor and town liquor
commissioner." State law and local ordinances provided that, upon conviction,
one-half of the defendant's fine went to the village." Of that sum, the mayor
would be reimbursed for his own expenses incurred while judging the case. 4
The Court unanimously found the laws unconstitutional."z The Court stated
that "Officers acting in ajudicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by
their interest in the controversy to be decided" whenever they face "possible
temptation to the average man as a judge.'
126
Though the Court found no evidence remotely suggesting that Judge-
Mayor Pugh's ruling was anything but fair, it recognized that judges must not
decide cases when circumstances objectively increase the likelihood of bias or
the appearance of bias. 7 If one accepts Alexander Hamilton's argument that
"[i]n the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence
amounts to a power over his will,"'2 then it is reasonable to conclude that any
financial temptation, regardless of how indirect or insubstantial, could possibly
tempt or appear to tempt any judge, even if only on a subtle or subconscious
level.
Beginning with this premise, various commentators have argued for
automatic disqualification whenever a judge has any financial interest in the
118. Id. at 646-47.
119. Id. at 652; see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 525 (1927) ("There was at the
common law the greatest sensitiveness over the existence of any pecuniary interest, however
small or infinitesimal....").
120. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, 80 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing need for lifetime salary and tenure
provisions).
121. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
122. Id. at 514-15,535.
123. Id. at 517-18.
124. See id. at 521-22.
125. Id. at 523.
126. Id. at 532.
127. Tourney, 273 U.S. at 535.
128. THE FEDERALISTNO. 79, at 497 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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matter before ,the court.129 Congress also has expressed concern over the
corrosive effects money has on judicial independence. In civil cases, federal
law requires that "[a] judge who owns a single share of stock in a large
corporation may not hear a suit for a few hundred dollars against it."' ° When
redraffing 28 U.S.C. § 455, the federal judge disqualification statute, a House
of Representatives joint committee report observed that "a judge's direct
economic or financial interest, even though relatively small, in the outcome of
the case may well be inconsistent with due process."''
As Congress recognized, courts have disqualified judges in various
instances where the judge's actual pecuniary interest was nominal. A typical
case is United States v. Nobel 3 In Nobel, the Third Circuit held that a trial
judge should have recused himself from a case involving the robbery of a bank
in which he owned stock.' The court based its ruling on the importance of
eliminating all appearances of impropriety. 34 It stressed that maintaining a
"strict overarching standard" of integrity required no less.'35 According to the
court, "[O]ne of the principal functions of ajudicial disqualification statute is
to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, which in
turn depends on a belief in the impersonality of judicial decisionmaking."'
Any room for financial interest in the outcome of a case would undermine that
impersonality.
3 7
Part VI will more fully discuss the merits of mandatory retirement policies
as an alternative to impeachment.' The point here is to support the definition
of the judicial power's essence as "the adjudication of cases and controversies
129. See, e.g., Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for
Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. L. REv. 662, 698-99 (1985) (discussing
automatic disqualification statute and rationale); Andrew L. Wright, Comment, Invested in the
Outcome: When the Judge Owns Stock in the Victim of the Crime, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 481,488-98
(1998) (discussing the implications of appearing before ajudge who has an interest in the case's
outcome).
130. John Leubsdorf, Theories ofJudging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
237, 238 (1987) (discussing application of 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1982)); see also Tatum v. S.
Pac. Co., 58 Cal. Rptr. 238, 239-40 (Ct. App. 1967) (disqualifying judge for ownership of stock
in corporate defendant); Steven Lubet, Beyond Reproach: Ethical Restrictions and the
ExtracurricularActivities ofState and Federal Judges 17 (Am. Judicial Soc'y 1984) (".T]he risk
of partiality would seem to be no greater in the case where the judge is employed by a business
than when the judge is a substantial investor or shareholder.").
131. Wright, supra note 129, at 495 (emphasis added).
132. 696 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1982).
133. Id. at 235-36.
134. Id.
135. Id. at236.
136. Id. at 235.
137. See also infra text accompanying notes 262-94 (discussing this point in the context
of the merits of mandatory retirement policies as an alternative to impeachment).
138. See infira text accompanying notes 262-94.
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independently and free from the appearance of bias." The next section will
consider and reject three policy-based arguments that states have used tojustify
upholding mandatory retirement policies under the rational basis standard of
review. While these states have urged that special employment rules should
apply to judges because of the unique roles judges hold in society, the next
Subpart argues that all of these arguments are seriously flawed.
B. Mandatory Retirement Undermines Values Inherent in the Judicial
Function
1. Limiting Public Censure of the Judiciary
Various court decisions have viewed a judge's essential job function so
broadly as to allow BFOQ defenses based upon the state's interest in limiting
public censure of the judiciary. 39 The Vermont Supreme Court, for example,
reasoned that because impeachment raises concerns about "'the purity, the
integrity, and the impartiality of the courts,"' mandatory retirement is not an
irrational method for avoiding the slightest possibility of impeachment of
elderly judges. 40 This reasoning suggests that mandatory retirement policies
should survive BFOQ scrutiny upon proof that one elderly judge's
impeachment might cause public concem about the integrity and competence
of all other judges. In the words of the Ohio Supreme Court, "[T]he citizens of
the state have a right to expect that the process of removing intellectually
deficient jurists will not evolve into the embarrassing spectacle of having the
aged, infirm, or senile judge forcibly removed from the bench.. 4
These opinions underscore the fact that judges are guardians of the public
trust and, like all other public servants, are held to the highest ethical standards.
The damaging consequences ofjudicial misbehavior are felt on two levels. On
the first level, the judge jeopardizes the ability of individual litigants to realize
their due process values. The trial becomes a meaningless, irrational exercise
that lacks any meaningful litigant participation, is unable to reach accurate
results, and appears blatantly improper. On another level, through a corrupt
judge's own behavior, the judge undermines the confidence in her rulings that
is necessary for them to be obeyed by the parties or enforced by the coordinate
branches. As noted earlier, without the respect of the coordinate branches or,
139. See, e.g., Maimed v. Thomburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 572 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding
mandatory retirement policies because, in part, the legislature placed "a premium on avoiding
the unpleasantness and public humiliation" of impeachment); State ex rel. Keefe v. Eyrich, 489
N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ohio 1986) (commenting that the public expects that judges be removed
without "the embarrassing spectacle" of impeachment); Aronstam v. Cashman, 325 A.2d 361,
366 (Vt. 1974) (stating disciplinary control and impeachment cause a loss in public confidence).
140. Aronstam, 325 A.2d at 365 (quoting Cady v. Lang, 115 A. 140, 142 (Vt. 1921)).
141. Keefe, 489 N.E.2d at 261.
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ultimately, the people, our well-ordered system of liberty may well degenerate
into anarchy. 42
Yet, without trivializing the high social costs resulting from impeachment
of malfeasant judges, the issue of whether age can be considered a BFOQ
reasonably necessary for independent adjudication is a separate question. The
rationale for mandatory retirement to avoid public demoralization of
impeachment runs as follows: Older judges are more likely to become
ineffective or incompetent judges; incompetent judges are more likely to be
impeached; and impeachment threatens public confidence. Therefore, every
older judge should be made to retire before being impeached.
This argument has several problems. Initially, as a matter of empirical
analysis, there is little evidentiary support that mental condition is a factor.
Senility or other age-induced incompetence has played almost no role, if any,
in any impeachment proceeding.'43 Rather, impeachments have almost
exclusively been for bribery, fraud, or other crimes of moral turpitude.'" To be
sure, it is possible to argue that elderly judges do become senile but are not
impeached only because of the difficulties of mounting a successful
impeachment. But this argument, too, is speculative. As explained later,
increasing age does not seem to be correlated in any way with diminished
judicial abilities. 45 Even if one feels that age produces incompetence, how does
this affect the argument? If older judges are not impeached, then the public
never has to endure an impeachment proceeding and therefore never suffers
any of its deleterious ramifications. Thus, preemptive retirement of all judges
will not avert this type of societal loss, for the loss will never be realized.
The crucial flaw with the impeachment-to-avoid-public-demoralization
argument, though, is that it fails to ask the question: Why do we impeach
judges in the first place? A judge is impeached for her own misbehavior. By
committing misconduct, the judge has jeopardized her own ability to decide a
case. It does not follow that any other judge has done similarly. If Judge A
were impeached, Judge B would not be impeached simply because the two are
friends. While judges are charged with acting in a way that will uphold the
public trust, they are not responsible for the behavior of other judges.
Therefore, public opinion aboutthe entirejudiciary is completely irrelevant
to whether an individual judge can perform the essence of the judicial function.
When hearing a case, the judge is to banish all thoughts of public opinion and
142. See supra text accompanying notes 87-9 1.
143. See generally WILLIAM THOMAS BRAiTHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THEJUDGES?: A STUDY
OF PROCEDURES FORREMOVALAND REnREMENT (1971) (surveying impeachment processes and
trials in several states); ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE
FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS (1992) (discussing facts and circumstances surrounding
impeachment of numerous federal judges).
144. See generally BR.AITHWAITE, supra note 143; BUSHNELL, supra note 143.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 174-80, 200-224.
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consider only the evidence properly admitted in the case.'46 Otherwise, the
judge would not be able to perform her counter-majoritarian role. To say that
public opinion is indispensable to judicial decisionmaking is to suggest that
public opinion should be a factor in the judge's ruling-a position that is
completely at odds with the role of the judiciary in our system of
government. 47 Commentators have repeatedly noted that a judge cannot be
removed from office simply because the public disagrees with some of the
judge's rulings. 4 ' If this were not true, then the threat of unemployment would
effectively undermine all of the protections designed to insulatejudges from the
populace.
If a judge cannot be impeached because of the judge's own unpopular
rulings, then it should certainly follow that a judge should not be forced into
retirement due to the actions of otherjudges, which are completely beyond an
individual judge's control and unrelated to that judge's own ability. Forced
retirement in these situations would sanction guilt by association and push
many competent jurists into premature retirement due to the sins of their few
incompetent colleagues. Such a view is nonsense. Courts have stated that the
BFOQ defense should be "'an extremely narrow exception' to the general
prohibition against age discrimination. 49 Thus, the definition of an essential job
function must also be narrowly tailored. Though the public demands "the
highest possible standards for their judges,"'50 it is inconceivable how one
judge's out-of-court behavior is more than tangential to the essence of the
business involved-another judge's ability to resolve cases and controversies
independently and free from the appearance of bias.
Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected an analogous argument inInternational
Union, UA Wv. Johnson Controls, Inc.,' in which abattery manufacturer tried
146. See MODEL CODEOFJUDICIAL CoNDuCr Canon 3B(2) (1999) ("A judge shall not be
swayed by ... public clamor or fear of criticism.").
147. See THEFEDERALISTNO. 78, at493 (AlexanderHamilton) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961)
(noting that judges should ignore popular opinion and consult nothing but "the Constitution and
the laws"); see also supra text accompanying notes 62-89 (discussing the judiciary's role in
government).
148. See, e.g., Jerome B. Meites & Steven F. Pflaum, Justice James D. Heiple:
Impeachment and the Assault on Judicial Independence, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 741, 806 (1998)
(arguing that political leaders who call for impeachment or removal of judges who render
unpopular decisions "pose a far greater danger to our justice system than an angry, arrogant, and
impolitic judge"); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the
Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 673, 689 (1999) (arguing
that if ajudge may be impeached because of "nothing more than the perceived incorrectness of
his constitutional decisions, then a judge will always be potentially subject to external political
pressure in his constitutional decisionmaking").
149. W. Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (quoting Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977)).
150. Aronstam v. Cashman, 325 A.2d 361, 364 (1974).
151. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
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to exclude all pregnant women from the assembly line. The employer argued
for a BFOQ exception because the work jeopardized the safety of the pregnant
workers' fetuses and safety was an essential job function.152 The Court
disagreed. While recognizing that "[n]o one can disregard the possibility of
injury to future children," it held that "the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that
it transforms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of battery
making."'53 Such an interpretation, the Court stated, would contradict "the
language of the BFOQ and the narrowness of its exception."'
54
If a BFOQ could be used to retire all employees simply because any one
of them might misbehave, there would be no limits to such a definition and,
therefore, no principled grounds upon which to limit the BFOQ exception. In
every business and governmental agency, older workers are more likely to
make more mistakes, move more slowly, or think less quickly than their
younger counterparts. Customers or clients also are sensitive to the behavior of
private or public employees. If all elderly judges could be forced to retire on
grounds that one might not perform adequately, then workers in every other
industry would be similarly vulnerable to mandatory retirement. Prohibitions
against age discrimination would be nullified in short order. Therefore, such a
justification for imposing mandatory retirement ages should fail.
2. Keeping with the Times
Other decisions have justified mandatory retirement policies because the
policies create vacancies that allow for the appointment of women, minorities,
and youngerjudges.'55 As a result, some feel that forced turnover will promote
diversity by allowing the "infusion of 'new blood' knowledgable [sic] in
modem trends in the law."' 56 The First Circuit, for example, has apparently
concluded that a forty-year-old person tends to view the world differently than
a seventy-year-old person.'57 In refusing to apply the ADEA to Massachusetts
statejudges, the court stated that "generational differences in points of view are
152. Id. at 202-04.
153. Id. at 203-04.
154. Id. at 204.
155. See, e.g., EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 58 (lst Cir. 1988) ("The forced
turnovermay permit the appointmentofjudges thatmore closelyreflect prevalent points ofview,
as well as the present societal makeup (and may even permit the state to redress past
inequities)."); O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) ("[A] state might
prescribe a mandatory retirement for judges in order to 'open up' judicial opportunities for
younger lawyers and to bring young persons with fresh ideas and techniques into the system.").
156. MaImed v. Thornburgh, 478 F. Supp. 998, 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1980).
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not fanciful."'s8 The court further stated that mandatory retirement "may permit
the appointment ofjudges that more closely reflect prevalent points of view, as
well as the present societal makeup"-goals that are "important state
interests.' 9
It is possible that some individuals support mandatory retirement because
they feel the policies will allow appointment of a younger, more diverse group
of judges who may be sensitive to the needs of discrete and insular minority
groups. For example, in the field of criminal law, social scientists have
typically hypothesized that "African-American judges would be more liberal,
and that liberal attitudes might make them 'more sympathetic to criminal
defendants than white judges are, since liberal views are associated with
support for the underdog and the poor, which defendants disproportionately
are. '9)) 6" Similarly, building upon Harvard psychologist Carol Gilligan's
"different voice" theory,161 researchers have suggested that women judges
would be more likely to pursue flexible means of dispute resolution than their
male counterparts, who ostensibly "tend to emphasize rights and rules" with
rigidity. 62 Women might, therefore, be more resistant than their male
counterparts to applying the criminal sentencing guidelines, with the
beneficiaries of such sentencing flexibility often being indigent or minority
defendants.
Unfortunately, there is neither reason to believe that young or minority
judges are more likely to have counter-majoritarian views than their older
colleagues, nor that retirement policies, on a structural level, will have any
influence on the beliefs of the appointing person or authority. 63 In fact, there
are several reasons why mandatory retirement policies may well work against
the cause of ideological diversity. Initially, the policies have the potential to
remove from the bench as many supporters of counter-majoritarian views as
they indirectly help to appoint, such as when abulk of elderly judges are retired
during a period when the appointing authority is not particularly sensitive to
individual rights. Making matters worse, census data indicates that mandatory
158. Id.
159. Id. at 58; see also PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 276 (1982) (discussing
Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan, justified partially on the grounds that the judiciary
needs a "constant infusion of new blood").
160. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical
Study ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1454 (1998) (quoting Susan Welch et al.,
Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 126, 127 (1988)).
161. CAROL GILLIGAN, INA DIFFERENT VOICE 1(1982).
162. Sisk et al., supra note 160, at 1451 (discussing the hypothesis that women tend to
view "moral conflicts as a problem of care and responsibility in relationships" while "men tend
to emphasize rights and rules" (quoting Sue Davis et al., VotingBehavior andGender on the U.S.
Courts ofAppeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 129 (1993))).
163. See id. at 1456 (theorizing that judicial selection process may screen out candidates
with atypical views); see also infra text accompanying notes 166-69.
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retirement ages will likely remove seasoned minority and women judges from
the bench prematurely. This data shows that sixty-five-year-old women and
sixty-five-year-old men should expect to live 84.2 and 80.4 years,
respectively.'" Sixty-five-year-old Caucasians should expectto live 82.6 years,
while sixty-five-year-old minorities should live to 81.5 years.' 6 Since women
live longer, mandatory retirement could disparately shorten the possible
working life of women, on one hand, while not giving qualified men and
women of all races the opportunity to continue working. If one believes that
women and minorities are more sensitive to the concerns of litigants with
similar backgrounds, then mandatory retirement may someday retire those
judges most likely to view their cause favorably. Blanket, indiscriminate
policies like mandatory retirement are poor instruments of social change.
In any event, it is more likely that the broad premise behind the "keep with
the times" theory is that the rulings of the judiciary should not deviate too far
from prevalent public opinion. After all, if the times do not change, then why
are judges born later in time better than older ones? The "keep with the times"
view therefore implies thatjudges should transform the law in response to what
judges perceive to be the current moral, social, and economic climate. Thus, a
judge's ideology becomes the prime qualification forjudging, and because this
view assumes that age is a reliable predictor of ajudge's beliefs, it elevates age
to BFOQ status.
This view has two obvious flaws. The first is that it is based on the
questionable assumption that age directly influences judicial decisions.
Repeated empirical analyses of such behavioral theories have been "largely
disappointing," leading many researchers to doubt their validity.'" "A final
inescapable conclusion about the explanatory power of the sociological
background characteristics of [judges] is that they are generally not very
helpful."'67 Indeed, returning to the earlier point about the possible influences
of race and gender upon ajudge's views of the federal sentencing guidelines,
research has shown that neither factor is a driving force forjudicial behavior.'68
This research is consistent with studies on the effect of judges' social
backgrounds in other areas of law. In the context of civil rights cases, 16 9 search
164. See Makar, supra note 15, at 49.
165. See id.
166. Sisk et al., supra note 160, at 1385 (reviewing numerous studies conducted over more
than a generation of empirical scholars).
167. Id. at 1387.
168. See id. at 1451-59.
169. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of
JudicialBackground on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STuD. 257,281 (1995) (stating that judges'
characteristics or political parties have relatively little effect on the outcome of cases).
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and seizure cases, 7° obscenity cases,171 or criminal sentencing prior to the
adoption of sentencing guidelines, 72 race and gender generally have had little
explanatory value forjudicial decisionmaking. The manifest weight of research
supports the claim that in most cases "the law-not the judge-dominates the
outcomes."1
73
There also seems to be little support for the position that older judges are
less familiar with legal trends than their younger colleagues. Some court
decisions sustaining mandatory retirement contain sheer speculation that a
mandatory retirement policy "may"'74 or "might"'75 result in a more competent
judiciary. Nevertheless, evidence leads to a contrary conclusion. A fuller
discussion of the benefits derived from an experienced judiciary are discussed
later, 76 but the findings of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Maimed v.
Thornburgh77 are relevant here. InMalmed, the court found absolutely nothing
"to show that elderly judges are any less cognizant of modem legal trends than
their younger counterparts." '78 Rather, "the record contains numerous
references to the benefits which the judicial system derives from the wisdom
and experience of former and retired judges who serve as seniorjudges.' ' 79 The
conclusion in Maimed is not surprising, especially in today's legal era, in
which, on one hand, cases are increasingly settled and trial skills are de-
emphasized, while on the other hand, judges are exclusively devoted to
developing and maintaining a broad range ofcaselaw and precedent. According
to the court:
We are not concerned . . . with an occupation that
requires sustained physical ability or stamina .... Rather, we
170. See, e.g., Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals,
77 JUDICATURE 129, 131-32 (1993) (noting relatively small difference between female and male
judges' decisionmaking in search and seizure cases).
171. See id.
172. See, e.g., Jason GrahI et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25
AM. J. POL. Sci. 308, 314-20 (1981) (discussing conviction rates with respectto male and female
judges); Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 AM.
J.POL. Sci. 884,888-91 (1978) (discussing conviction rates and sentencing with respect to black
judges).
173. Ashenfelter et al., supra note 169, at 281.
174. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1988).
175. O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Mo. 1978) (en bane).
176. See infra Part IV.C.
177. 478 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.
1980).
178. Id. at 1010.
179. Id.; see also LAWRENCE M. FREIDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME: THE LAW OF AGE
DISCRIMINATION AND MANDATORY RETIREMENT 99 (Soc. Research Perspectives: Occasional
Reports on Current Topics No. 10, 1984) (arguing that the notion that "fresh blood" is needed
for new ideas is "for most people simply a prejudice").
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are dealing with judges, a most unique and select class of
individuals. The evidence before me showed that it is a
serious mistake to consider the population as a whole when
determining an age at which physical and mental abilities
begin to deteriorate.... [P]ersons, such as judges, who have
advanced education and who have succeeded in reaching the
upper levels oftheir profession are likely to survive and retain
their abilities for a substantially longer period of time than the
population at large.8 0
But even if youth enables judges to "keep with the times," mandatory
retirement policies might not promote that end. All but three states appoint
judges for a period of years rather than life.' While each reappointment
decision already presents the opportunity to appoint individuals "who more
closely reflect prevalent points of view, as well as the present societal
makeup,"'" thejudicial recruitment process tends to screen out candidates with
rigid or unconventional views. 18 Because mandatory retirement policies do not
change the incentive of the appointing person or agency, they will not diversify
the judiciary unless they are accompanied by affirmative action policies or
ideological litmus tests. In fact, in some situations, mandatory retirement
policies risk reducing the judiciary's racial or gender diversity rather than
augmenting it. If a judge is forced to retire upon reaching a certain age, for
example, rather than completing the judge's entire term, then the successor
might be chosen by a conservative administration that would not have been in
power if the judge's term had gone its full length. If fears of incumbent
entrenchment are correct, there is an appreciable chance that mandatory
retirement will simply lead to the perpetuation of judges of one particular
ideology rather than a vast multitude.
Worse, supposing that a quota system were established and qualified
judges could be found, supporters of mandatory retirement give no guidance
as to how judges should reach the ends that society desires. Should a judge
determine society's prevalent points of view by rubber-stamping all of the
legislature's initiatives? Or should judges follow Professor Unger's call to
unilaterally undertake a "bold remaking of law, whether constitutional law or
ordinary law" rather than wait for the majoritarian branches, which he believes
180. Maimed, 478 F. Supp. at 1014.
181. The three states are Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. In addition,
judges in New Jersey are eligible for lifetime appointment after first serving a seven-year term.
See WARPICK, supra note 19, at 19-20 tbl.1l (Supreme Court Justices); id. 21-22 tbl.12
(Intermediate Appellate Court Judges); id. at 23-25 tbl.13 (General Jurisdiction Court Judges).
182. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1988).
183. See Sisk et al., supra note 160, at 1456 n.288.
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suffer from an "undemocratic taint" themselves?" 4 If the latter, then how
should judges determine the true voice of the people? With opinion polls? And
at what point would a view be "prevalent"? When a majority agrees? An
oppressed minority? When Professor Unger says? Proponents of these radical
theories have produced no workable solution most likely because their
proposals could never be reconciled with the role of the judiciary in our
tripartite system of government.
Once it is accepted that a judge's rulings should conform to popular
sentiment, all of the values of procedural due process are jeopardized. The
judiciary is unique "because of its consciously chosen, carefully protected
unrepresentativeness.' ' 5 If the judiciary is to enforce counter-majoritarian
constitutional norms, it must be shielded from encroachment by the
majoritarian branches. At the same time, precisely because of its
unrepresentativeness, the judiciary must not usurp the political branches'
functions and authority. 6 We need not reject behavior theory to see the
difference between tolerating a judge's inevitable subconscious biases and
actively encouraging majoritarian-oriented decisionmaking. Quite simply, it is
impossible to argue that ajudge's essential function is both to remain impartial
and to produce results which please the majority. Defining the judge's essential
duties this way would violate separation of powers and constrain and preordain
a judge's rulings. The result, history has shown, may well be arbitrary and
oppressive.'
87
At best, mandatory retirement policies are designed to facilitate result-
oriented judging, with judges keeping a careful eye on the views of the
populace. At worst, as this Article explains in later detail, mandatory retirement
policies create incentives for judges to decide cases based upon the judge's
own self-interest.' Any possible benefits are speculative, while all the harmful
ramifications are all too obvious: namely, the values of participation, equality,
accuracy, and appearance of fairness are all placed beyond reach. For these
reasons, the argument that mandatory retirement policies will enable judges to
"keep with the times" is not sufficiently compelling to justify their adoption.
184. ROBERTO MANOABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 118
(1996).
185. Redish, supra note 88, at 302.
186. See id. at 302-03.
187. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 338 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("Were the power ofjudging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would
be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were itjoined to the
executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor." (citing
Montesquieu)).
188. See infra Part VI.
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3. Efficient Administration of Justice
Finally, some cases have implied that a mandatory retirement policy is
appropriate if it promotes judicial efficiency by assuring "ease in establishing
and administering pension plans,"'8 9 or by reducing "delays in the
administration of justice caused by death or disabling illness of sitting
judges."190
Avoiding unnecessary expenses is certainly important to any public
employer. Citizens bemoan higher tax burdens while politicians pledge to run
government like a business.' 9' However, these considerations are insufficient
to justify a BFOQ. The efficiency argument amounts to the proposition that an
employee's essential job functions are whatever an employer deems necessary
to maximize profits. This position was summarily rejected in Wilson v.
Southwest Airlines Co."9 Southwest supported its policy with surveys
indicating that attractive flight attendants were essential to customer
satisfaction and stated that it would lose business unless it hired only women
flight attendants.'93 However, the court refused to find that any particular
gender was reasonably necessary to perform the job's essential duties.194 The
court stated:
Without doubt the goal of every business is to make a profit.
For purposes of BFOQ analysis, however, the business
"essence" inquiry focuses on the particular service provided
and the job tasks and functions involved, not the business
goal. If an employer could justify employment discrimination
merely on the grounds that it is necessary to make a profit,
Title VII would be nullified in short order. 95
SouthwestAirlines involved a private airline that was seeking to maximize
profits in a highly competitive industry. To the extent that age discrimination
laws prevent employers from responding to negative societal stereotypes, such
189. O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
190. Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1979).
191. The state "must remain a responsible steward of the public trust by maintaining an
efficient and productive government." Peacev. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 507 S.E.2d 272,281
(N.C. 1998); see also McFadden, supra note 103, at 673 (arguing that efficiency is one essential
component of governmental legitimacy). Regulations to minimize government waste are
considered valid exercises of the state's police power. See Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43
F.3d 609, 614 (11th Cir. 1995).
192. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
193. See id. at 295-96.
194. Id. at 302-04.
195. Id. at 302 n.25.
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as the view that only women flight attendants can attract business or that the
elderly are unable to function in the workplace, the prohibitions will result in
some loss of profits. Nevertheless, in the private sphere, efficiency concerns
will not satisfy the first prong of the BFOQ test. 96
The analysis should not change when applied to public employers. It goes
without question that an essential component ofgovernmental legitimacy is the
ability to provide services efficiently. However, government can internalize
costs that would be insufferable in the competitive private sphere, for
governmental bodies can tax constituents to defray those costs. While age
discrimination laws may carry costs such as the impeachment of poor judges
or the appointment of additional judges to help minimize existing caseloads,
those costs reflect a determination by the legislature that such costs are
necessary to further a compelling societal interest that outweighs considerations
of efficiency. In other words, the policy considerations have already been
weighed by the political branches, and they have arrived at the conclusion that
any additional costs are justified. Courts have no authority to substitute their
judgment for that of the legislature.
The efficiency argument is especially inappropriate as applied to the
judiciary because prophylactic measures are essential in avoiding the
appearance of bias in judicial decisionmaking. Thus, the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct"9 is replete with regulations that preventjudges from hearing
cases in a wide variety of situations, regardless of whether inaccurate rulings
would result in fact. 9 These regulations necessarily prohibit a broad class of
efficient, acceptable activity, and the benefits are often difficult to quantify, for
one cannot tell if, when, or how often the regulations have actually been
needed. An efficiency-oriented test will sacrifice many such protections
because it "weighs an inevitable and immediately recognizable administrative
cost against a largely prophylactic interest.""' But because such prophylactic
measures are essential to maintaining public confidence, the efficient
administration of justice cannot be deemed essential to the exercise of the
judicial function.
C. Young Age Is Not "Reasonably Necessary" for Independent
Adjudication
It is clear that the only viable definition of the judicial function is one that
recognizes that judges must decide cases independently and free from the
appearance of bias. States do not have a factual basis to support the belief that
196. See EGcLIT, supra note 95, § 5.09, at 5-35.
197. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2000).
198. See, e.g., id. Canon 3(E).
199. Redish & Marshall, supra note 98, at 473.
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increasing age jeopardizes a judge's ability to perform the essence of the
judicial function.2" Therefore, this Subpart argues that states will be unable to
meetthe first prong of the BFOQ test. Some courts have erroneously found that
the mere existence of a correlation between advanced age and declining mental
skills sufficiently justifies the use of a mandatory retirement policy.20' These
courts have missed the point.22 The relevant issue is whether any decline in
judicial decisionmaking also compromises the judge's decisionmaking.23 It
does not. Whatever may be said about the general population, research in the
judicial arena suggests that old age and efficient judging go hand in hand.
Judging is the type of occupation in which performance peaks later in life and
remains stable until the onset of senility.2°4 The judiciary is not "the nation's
premier geriatric occupation" without reason, and states have no basis for
holding any presumption that older judges cannot fulfill their essential job
functions.0 5
Initially, one should note that very few states establish an absolute
retirement age that applies in all situations. Rather, many states force all judges
to retire, but then recall judges to serve as "senior judges" who can choose the
size and breadth of their caseload.2" Other states establish presumptive
mandatory retirement ages yet still allow judges to complete their terms of
office, even after reaching the designated age.207 In itself, this policy of retiring
200. See W. Airliies, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985) (requiring that an
employer show factual basis for belief of necessity of age-based employment criteria). Though
generalizations are not sufficient to support a BFOQ, some courts upholding mandatory
retirement ages under the rational basis standard of review have justified their decisions in
precisely such terms. See, e.g., Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 628 n.9 (7th Cir. 1979)
(referring to an anecdote about ajudge who refused to retire); O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761,
767 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (concluding that society's recognition that "physical and mental
processes weaken" at age seventy is embodied in statutes and retirement systems); Nelson v.
Miller, 480 P.2d 467, 473-74 (Utah 1971) (rationalizing that retirement is "a way of life").
201. See, e.g., Trafelet, 594 F.2d at 627 (referring to evidence of"an association between
aging... and a decline in intellectual function and personality factors").
202. See Note, Questioning Age-Old Wisdom: The Legality of Mandatory Retirement of
TenuredFaculty Under theADEA, 105 HAR.L.REv. 889,898 (1992) ("The argument that older
employees are not as mentally sharp as younger employees holds true in every job that requires
more than minimal intelligence.").
203. Because irrationality impairs independent thought, an irrational judge compromises
all of our judicial system's values. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the values of the judicial
system).
204. See infra text accompanying notes 206-20.
205. POSNER, supra note 11, at 180; see also infra text accompanying notes 206-20
(explaining the advantages of a mature judiciary).
206. See Alice Ann Winters, Judicial Retirement and Pension Plans 1-85 (American
Judicature Society 1961 and Supp. 1995) (compiling statutes ofstate pension plans). Cf Wilfred
Feinberg, Senior Judges: A National Resource, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 409, 412-14 (1990)
(discussing contributions of seniorjudges to judicial system).
207. See sources cited supra note 10.
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judges only to rehire them has obvious problems. After all, if a state employer
can determine which individual judges are capable of continuing employment,
then it raises doubts about its concurrent assertion that it needs a generalized
policy due to the impracticability of individualized assessment."'
A state might respond with the argument that, while it is easy to determine
which judges are capable of continuing work, it is much more difficult to
impeach incompetent judges against their will. As a result, mandatory
retirement may provide the only practical way to separate the wheat from the
chaff. But this argument is unpersuasive, for a similar claim could be made in
virtually every industry. For example, it is difficult to revoke an elderly
professor's tenure status or to remove any employee within a close-knit
corporation in which friendships may have developed that preclude completely
impartial assessment. However, the thrust of age discrimination laws is to force
employers to make individualized determinations despite the inconvenience or
cost.' Thus, even within states that use mandatory retirement policies, it is not
clear that the policies are conclusive evidence of a presumptive link between
old age and poor judging.
If the crucial analysis is whether elderly judges can perform their judicial
duties competently, one might look to empirical data for guidance.
Unfortunately, most courts and commentators have given this issue only
cursory attention. Because courts have typically considered the permissibility
of mandatory retirement policies under the lenient rational basis standard of
review, their decisions are often bereft of empirical data. Additionally, no
published studies have considered whether older judges, as a class, have
difficulty remaining impartial and diligent in their duties.21 Without the help
of scientific data, previous discussions have often degenerated into battles of
anecdotes, with opponents of mandatory retirement referring to the lengthy
distinguished careers of the likes of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis,
208. See EGLIT, supra note 95, § 5.05, at 5-22 (noting that an employer's use of exceptions
"belie[s] the claimed need" for the general policy).
209. Certainly, the state could implement less restrictive, though equally effective,
guidelines for reducing the work of overly-burdened judges. An obvious example would be to
assign fewer cases to elderly judges or to adopt a senior status system similar to the one used by
the federal government. See Feinberg, supra note 206, at 412-14.
210. Perhaps the only arguably relevant scientific data that currently exists are studies of
university professors, whose jobs are analogous to those of judges because both involve
intellectual abilities. In one 1985 study, older people scored lower on certain creativity tests, and
in other studies, older professors generally have been less interested in academic research than
their younger colleagues. See Note, supra note 202, at 898. But these studies may be of little
value because judging involves application of existing precedent rather than creativity, judges
are not expected to uncover and publish groundbreaking research, and judges may turn to their
law clerks for aid with extraordinary matters.
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or Learned Hand, while supporters refer to lesser-known judges who have
tarried on the bench long past their prime."1
Judge Richard Posner has developed an alternative means of evaluating
judicial performance, at least on the appellate level, by measuring the quantity
and quality of ajudge's written opinions." Judge Posner's studies suggest that
increased age had no effect on the number of opinions written by federal
appellate courtjudges appointed between 1955 and 1984.213 The surveys also
showed that the quality of opinions held constant, as measured by the number
of citations to each opinion.214 Equating citations with quality seems
reasonable, for a citation signifies that later courts understood the earlier
decision and grappled with its analysis. Also, assuming that courts are more
likely to cite the opinions of respected judges above mundane ones, a steady
citation rate across time signals that the work continues to be held to some
degree of regard.21 Moreover, Posner's data should basically hold true for a
discussion of state judges' abilities. State judges are presumed equally
competent to decide cases arising under federal law,216 and they have even
more expertise interpreting cases pursuant to their state statutes and common
law.
Posner's research might initially seem somewhat surprising, given that the
legal system places a premium on reasoning by analogy. Analogy is a branch
of practical reasoning that draws on fluid intelligence, and fluid intelligence
generally declines with age.217 However, fluid intelligence is primarily
associated with creativity rather than writing ability, and creativity plays only
a marginal role in adjudication.28 Rather, "[t]he distinguishing feature of most
greatjudges, even those rightly pronounced 'brilliant,' has not been exceptional
analytical power; it has been exceptional rhetorical power. '21 9 Rhetorical ability
is primarily a function of crystallized intelligence, and it is one of the "least
likely [abilities] to decline with age until senility sets in." '
211. Compare Makar, supra note 15, at 49 (criticizing states' mandatory retirement
statute), with Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 628 n.9 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding Illinois
mandatory retirement provisions).
212. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 184-92.
213. See id. at 184-86. Judges normally write fewer opinions after taking senior status, but
this is mainly because their workload decreases substantially. Id. at 186-87.
214. Id. at 183-84.
215. See, e.g., Mary Anne Bobinski, Comment, Citation Sources and the New York Court
ofAppeals, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 965,965 (1985) (arguing that judges "are both seeking legitimacy
and legitimizing the source used" by citing to a particular authority).
216. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that a state court must exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over federal claims).
217. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 192.
218. See id. at 198.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 199.
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Age is a poor predictor of judicial performance for numerous additional
reasons. First, judges deciding between competing arguments often draw upon
materials already circulated on diverse topics including political science,
economics, religion, and philosophy. Thus, they must keep abreast of current
intellectual trends and legal practices, and they must not be wedded to any
particular ideology or the status quo. Olderjudges in no way fail to meet these
requirements. Courts have found no evidence that "elderly judges are any less
cognizant of modem legal trends than their younger counterparts,"''n and
research has shown that age is "seldom... of value in explaining judicial
behavior."' Second, generalized knowledge helps judges reflect upon the
probable consequences of, and possible alternatives to a ruling. Such
knowledge and wisdom is best acquired through life experience, which is
positively correlated with age. "In short," according to Judge Posner, "a mature
professional judgment is central to the concept of a wise judge, and the
intellectual and dispositional qualities that go to create such ajudgment plainly
improve with age up to a point.., and then plateau until senility." Finally,
a judge's familiarity with legal precedent, issues, and practices increases the
longer she sits on the bench. The confidence accompanying this increased
familiarity helps olderjudges reach decisions more quickly and efficiently than
younger appointees.?
Supporters of mandatory retirement ages either ignore or fail to appreciate
the benefits that older judges bring to adjudication. Yet, because of these
benefits, states may not be able to show that youthfulness is reasonably
necessary for effective, efficient, and impartial adjudication. Rather, forcing
elderly judges into retirement can have much more deleterious social
consequences than allowing them to continue serving until the completion of
their terms. Obviously, additional research about the complex relationship
between age and judicial ability would help courts and commentators make
more informed decisions about whether mandatory retirement policies should
satisfy the first prong of the BFOQ test. But regardless of whether a state could
meet this burden, it would also have to prove that impeachment is such an
impractical means of removing incompetent judges that it justifies a
generalized mandatory retirement policy. The next Part argues that states
cannot make such a showing.
221. Maimed v. Thornburgh, 478 F. Supp. 998, 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 621 F.2d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). Rather, the record contained "numerous references
to the benefits which the judicial system derives from the wisdom and experience of former and
retired judges who serve as seniorjudges." Id. at 998.
222. Sisk et al., supra note 160, at 1459 ("Although early studies found a judge's age to
be significant... more recent empirical studies have seldom found age to be of value in
explaining judicial behavior.") (citations omitted).
223. POSNER, supra note 11, at 194.
224. See id. at 197.
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V. BFOQ ANALYSIS: THE IMPRACTICABILITY PRONG AND THE RISK OF
JUDICIAL MISBEHAVIOR
The second prong of the BFOQ test can be satisfied in two ways. An
employer can either prove that it has "'reasonable cause to believe.., that all
or substantially all [persons over the age qualifications] would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved"' or that "it is
'impossible or highly impractical to deal with the older employees on an
individualized basis."' ' Finally, although this point is far less obvious and has
not been recognized by other commentators, courts will sustain the generalized
policy only if it advances the employer's goals in a more equal or more
acceptable manner than the impractical individualized method 26
Although efficiency arguments have not been well received when used to
define the essential functions of a business,'" courts determine a policy's
"impracticability" precisely in such terms. Without question, there are
significant costs and, thus, inefficiency and impracticability are inherent in the
impeachment process.228 However, mandatory retirement policies come at an
even higher cost: they undermine the integrity and independence of the
judiciary by giving soon-to-be retired judges financial incentives to decide
cases based upon the judge's self-interest rather than an impartial assessment
of the evidence presented in court. 9 As a result, the policies are poor
alternatives to impeachment. They threaten the core values of our judicial
system. State laws against age discrimination should not protect these policies,
and the policies should find no countenance within impracticability prong of
the BFOQ test.
The standard refrain is that utilitarian factors, such as cost, can never
support finding individualized treatment impractical.2 0 However, this position
ignores reality for whenever an employer is allowed to make generalized
employment decisions, the court must have drawn the line based on some
225. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,414 (1985) (quoting Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235 (5th Cir. 1976)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
The employer must establish a "substantial basis" for its belief that individual testing is
impractical. Id. at 422-23. It must meet this requirement and all other elements of the BFOQ test
by a preponderance of the evidence. See EGLIT, supra note 95, § 5.05, at 5-18 to -19.
226. See infra Part V.B. The preceding discussion, supra Part IV.C., has shown that states
would have grave difficulties demonstrating that substantially all older appointed judges could
not perform their essential judicial duties.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 192-96.
228. See infra text accompanying notes 262-65.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 267-76.
230. See EGLIT, supra note 95, § 5.09, at 5-35 (stating that "the courts-with but one
exception-have asserted that economic factors cannot be the basis for a BFOQ").
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utilitarian or efficiency-related justification." To say that individualized
treatment is impractical is akin to saying that it would be unreasonable to force
the employer to make decisions in such a manner. Perhaps the method is too
time consuming, too expensive, or too inaccurate. In other words, it is
inefficient. Whatever the reason, individual determinations must therefore be
"impractical" when they cannot be done at an efficient cost.
Efficiency is a term with many possible meanings. This Article adopts a
definition similar to one articulated by Professors Freed and Polsby in an earlier
essay considering the breadth and scope of Title VII's BFOQ exception.232
Freed and Polsby have argued that an efficient cost is one that minimizes two
"risk costs" associated with the employment decision. 3 Risk costs, however,
have three components: (1) information costs, (2) the value of risks remaining
because of imperfect knowledge, and (3) the cost of employee misbehavior in
response to a given policy." Freed and Polsby explain the first two
components of risk costs as follows:
The first component is information costs-that is, the costs
the employer bears to acquire information that can be used to
reduce risk. The second component is the expected value of
risks that remain because of imperfect knowledge. In our
context, the two components of risk costs will be the out-of-
pocket expense of using a decision criterion and the expected
value of risks that remain because a particular decision
criterion does not perfectly disclose the information sought?
Because Freed and Polsby do not discuss a third possible component of risk
costs-the cost of employee misbehavior in response to a given policy-they
apparently assume that this cost is zero. 6
A simple example clarifies Freed and Polsby's definition. Imagine that an
employer is planning to hire a group of people to help move fumiture. The
employer is looking for people who can lift boxes that weigh as much as 300
pounds without dropping the box and mining its contents. In other words, the
employer seeks strong people do not have butterfingers. The information costs
will be the costs of screening applicants for their ability to lift boxes without
231. See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, andthe Equality ofMen
and Women: A Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, 3 AM. B. FOuND. REs.
J. 583, 602 (1981).
232. See id. at 603.
233. Id.
234. See infra text accompanying notes 256-94.
235. Freed & Polsby, supra note 231, at 603 (emphasis added).
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dropping them. It may be easy to determine whether an applicant can lift a 300
pound box: give her the box and ask her to pick it up. It is far more difficult,
however, to determine whether the applicant has butterfingers-a test would
involve repeatedly lifting boxes of different sizes and under different
conditions. The employer could probably devise such a test, but it may be quite
expensive. Thus, the employer's risk costs of hiring movers would be the costs
of any screening tests, along with an estimate of the likelihood and possible
damages that may result if the employee drops a box while on the job.
At some point, the employer has to decide upon the optimal balance
between the information costs the employer will pay and the remaining risk
costs the employer will accept due to imperfect knowledge. In the end, the
employer may have to accept the fact that she cannot eliminate all risks of
butterfingered movers, regardless of the informational costs she bears. The
employer may then seek to substitute a generalized hiring policy to screen
unsatisfactory employees. Unfortunately, this policy may eliminate many
qualified employees, who would have passed an individualized test."?
Courts perform the same type of analysis when they determine whether to
allow an employer to use a generalized age-based employment policy rather
than an individualized one. Such analysis is implicit in Western Air Lines, Inc.
v. Criswell,"8 the Supreme Court's most extensive discussion of the
impracticability prong. In Criswell the airline claimed that young age was a
BFOQ reasonably necessary to the safe transportation of passengers because
older pilots are more prone to sudden, debilitating illness than younger pilots.u 9
Therefore, the airline refused to employ flight engineers after their sixtieth
birthday.4 Employee Criswell argued that regular, individualized tests could
assess each employee's health and fitness; however, the airline maintained that
such testing was impractical.24 In response, the Court enunciated its well-
known rule for determining whether individualized treatment or generalized
treatment is required: "The greater the safety factor, measured by the
likelihood of harm and the probable severity of that harm in case of an
accident, the more stringent may be the job qualifications designed to insure
safe [job performance]. 242
In other words, generalized mandatory retirement policies should be
sustained when (1) individual exams have high costs, (2) individual exams do
not come close to eliminating all the risks of physical incapacitation, and (3)
237. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 231, at 603-04.
238. 472 U.S. 400,414-17 (1985).
239. Id. at 404.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 405-08.
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the cost of the remaining risks is also extremely high. Where to draw the line,
of course, cannot be precisely determined. It is a fact-based inquiry.
Nevertheless, lower courts have found their way the best they can.243 For
instance, in EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol244 the state argued for a
BFOQ exception requiring state troopers to retire at the age of sixty, due to
increased health risks that jeopardized their work ability.245 The state troopers
suggested alternative individualized tests that could predict a trooper's health
with reasonable accuracy.' However, the costs of individualized testing were
very high (as the tests were very expensive and carried "high risks of physical
harm to the officers being tested"), and the risk costs were also high (as the
tests had significant margins of error and could not easily predict serious risks
of physical incapacitation),. 7 Because of the high costs and high remaining
risk, the court upheld the mandatory retirement policy.248 Similarly, in
Professional Pilots Federation v. FAA"4 9 the pilots presented evidence that
various tests could almost completely identify the potential for heart attacks,
but the court sustained the airline's BFOQ defense.5" No tests could determine
the risk of other ailments, and an airline disaster could jeopardize lives and
property worth many millions of dollars."'
On the other hand, in EEOC v. City ofBowling Green 2 the court enjoined
a police department from using a mandatory retirement policy when the
243. See, e.g., Prof'l Pilots Fed'n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758,770 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding
the FAA's mandatory retirement program); EEOCv. Miss. State Tax Comm'n, 693 F. Supp. 516,
526-27 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (upholding mandatory retirement for officers), rev'don othergrounds,
848 F.2d 526, 533 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated, 873 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1989); Greer v. S.C.
Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep't, 632 F. Supp. 903, 907 (D.S.C. 1986) (upholding mandatory
retirement of conservation officers); EEOC v. City of Linton, 623 F. Supp. 724, 726 (S.D. Ind.
1985) (striking down minimum age requirement of thirty-five to be hired as apolice officer); see
also EEOC v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 453-55 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding the
mandatory retirement age of sixty for police officers); Keating v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611,613 (9th
Cir. 1979) (upholding FAA's mandatory retirement program); EEOC v. City of Bowling Green,
607 F. Supp. 524,526 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (rejecting mandatory retirement ofpolice officers at age
of fifty-five); EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333, 1344-48 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (upholding
mandatory retirement ofhighway patrol officers), rev'don othergrounds, 768 F.2d 514,518 (3d
Cir. 1985), vacated, 829 F.2d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 1987); EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp.
1135,114043 (D. Minn. 1980) (enjoining fire department from enforcing mandatory retirement
of fire chiefs at sixty-five).
244. 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984).
245. See id. at 450-51.
246. See id. at 453.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 455 (finding the remaining costs were intolerable because "public safety and
lives depend upon the capabilities of Patrol members").
249. 118 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
250. See id. at 770.
251. See id. at 765.
252. 607 F. Supp. 524 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
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individualized tests cost only $5000 initially and another $5000 each year, and
all officers could be screened for all significant health risks with high levels of
accuracy." 3 And in EEOC v. City ofSt. Paul 4 the court split the difference by
requiring the city to perform widely-used, accurate tests of individual
applicants for positions as fire department district chiefs, yet allowing the city
to resort to a generalized age-based retirement policy, rather than spend more
than $230,000 each year on tests that were only somewhat reliable for
predicting performance of firefighters.25 Presumably, the costs of acquiring
information about the health of district chiefs were inexpensive and left risks
of tolerable social cost, whereas tests for firefighters were quite expensive and
had a high probability of expensive consequences resulting from a firefighter's
sudden incapacitation at the scene.
It is important to note a point that other commentators have missed: when
courts declare an individualized policy impractical, they necessarily allow its
replacement with a less costly-and, therefore, more acceptable and
efficient-alternative 6 In most cases, the comparative efficiency of the
generalized policy will be obvious. After all, if individualized testing were not
unduly burdensome, the employer would have no reason for abandoning it.
Consider the generalized policies in EEOCv. Missouri State HighwayPatrol2 7
and Professional Pilots Federation v. FAA." s The policies are more efficient
than individual treatment because they create no appreciable incentives for
employee misbehavior. During their last few weeks of work, state troopers who
are facing mandatory retirement have no reason to jeopardize public safety by
shirking their patrol duties. If they ignore a distress call or behave recklessly
when apprehending a suspect then they can expect discipline, civil liability, or
grave personal harm. Similarly, pilots have no added incentive to crash a plane,
regardless of whether they are retiring voluntarily ormandatorily.5 9 To be sure,
the prospect of a shortened career might induce some employees to steal from
253. Id. at 526.
254. 500 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Mirm. 1980).
255. See id. at 1141-43.
256. See EEOC v. City of Linton, 623 F. Supp. 724,726 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (rejecting BFOQ
claim because "acceptable alternatives" would "better or equally advance" employer's goal).
257. 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984).
258. 118 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
259. The employer, of course, is primarily concerned with minimizing the risks of sudden,
incapacitating illness. This risk holds true in every industry. What is unique about mandatory
retirement policies applied to states judges is that, unlike in other industries, the policies
unnecessarily create incentives for intentional misbehavior in defiance of the essence of thejob.
See infra notes 268-94 and accompanying text.
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their employers or use other measures to inflate their income while employed.
But this risk can only be considered remote.2"'
In very limited situations, a generalized age-based BFOQ policy is so
costly that it is no more acceptable than its individualized alternative. In these
situations, courts should not abandon the preferred method of individual
assessment because doing so will erode their state's age discrimination law.
26'
The next section argues that mandatory retirement policies should not survive
BFOQ scrutiny.
VI. MANDATORY RETIREMENT POLICIES ARE NOT PREFERABLE
ALTERNATIVES TO IMPEACHMENT
Admittedly, impeachment or similar procedures262 are severe obstacles to
removing incompetent judges. Conviction normally requires a supermajority
vote. Determinations of fitness are subjective, and politics or personal
friendships may render accurate individual assessment impossible. For these
reasons, since the earliest days of the republic, impeachment has been called
"a bugbear, which has lost its terrors. '263 It "is unlikely to be used except in the
most extreme cases," despite the fact that incompetentjudges jeopardize life,
liberty, and property of immeasurable value. Moreover, impeachment is begun
after impropriety has already occurred. It cannot compensate those parties that
have already been injured. Thus, states bear another risk cost of incompetent
judges--possibly inaccurate prior rulings.265 In terms of the earlier analysis,
individualized treatment of older judges carries high informational costs that
leave a high risk of potentially high future damages. As a result, one might
expect that states should be able to satisfy the impracticability prong.
However, mandatory retirement has the added cost of encouraging
employee misbehavior that is detrimental to the essence of the judicial power.
The potential for employee misbehavior is a cost that Professors Freed and
Polsby have either overlooked or mistakenly assumed to be zero in all
260. If the risk is too high, employers may refuse to hire older employees, who would have
the greatest incentives to shirk. Cf EGLIT, supra note 95, at § 5.12 (discussing age limits as
BFOQs for hiring). However, to the extent that the presumably rational employers in
Professional Pilots and Missouri State did not opt for this provision, one may safely assume they
viewed their employees' actions to be independent of the policy dictating their retirement.
261. See supra notes 4-5, 18, and accompanying text (discussing intent and purpose of age
discrimination laws).
262. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(b) - (g) (authorizing judicial review board to
conduct public hearing and suspend or retire judges who are unable to perform official duties).
263. Robert Rantoul, Jr., Oration at Scituate (July 4,1836), in PRESSER&ZAINALDINSupra
note 80, at 256.
264. Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1979).
265. See Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (stating that potential for
appellate relief does not cure problems created by an incompetent trial judge).
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situations.2 Not so. Consider the following example: Judge Jones is nearing
mandatory retirement. The final case on his docket is the civil case of Vv. XYZ
Corp. Victim V alleges thatXYZ discriminated against her on the basis of sex,
in violation of applicable state employment legislation. V claims that her
supervisor created a hostile work environment by making numerous sexually
suggestive comments over aperiod ofseveral months.XYZmoves for summary
judgment, arguing that no reasonable person would have considered these
relatively isolated incidents sufficient to constitute harassment.267
Judge Jones is like most other judges. He realizes that he could rule either
way. Case law in the controlling jurisdiction would justify granting or denying
XYZ's motion.268 Judge Jones has also noticed thatXYZis represented byA, one
of the state's oldest, largest, and most prestigious corporate law firms. A pays
one of the region's highest salaries and employs numerous attorneys on a part-
time and "of counsel" basis. Over the years, many individuals, some of whom
were in their golden years, have left public service and joined A, where they
have enjoyed additional years of work as senior partners. V, on the other hand,
is represented by an unremarkable sole practitioner with limited resources, no
political or societal connections, and no desire to take on additional help.
In the end, with an eye towards future employment with A, Judge Jones
writes a cogent, well-reasoned opinion granting XYZ's motion for summary
judgment. Vfiles no appeal, and Judge Jones retires several months later. Firm
A subsequently offers him a position as a senior partner, and he accepts.
Mandatory retirement policies may well encourage retiring judges to
behave like Judge Jones. Most state policies force judges to retire when they
are still willing and capable of continuing employment, either as ajudge or an
attorney.2 69 Even within the federal system, a disconcerting number ofjudges
have left the bench to return to private practice, despite the absence of
mandatory retirement and the existence of comfortable retirement plans.
Seventeen of the twenty judges who left the bench during the 1970s accepted
266. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 231, at 602-05.
267. These facts are a slight modification of those in Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50
F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) in which the court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor
of employee.
268. Compare Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(affirming grant of summary judgment for employer as to retaliation in violation of Title VII
claim and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim), and Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 433
(reversing judgment for the employee plaintiff), with Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Tr., 12 F. Supp.
2d 870, 884 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (denying University's summary judgment motion as to plaintiff's
hostile work environment claim).
269. See VAN TASSEL, supra note 28, at 14-17, 40 (finding that some federal judges return
to private practice despite government's generous retirement and pension plans). Cf POSNER,
supra note 10, at 193 ("[An] important asset of ajudge is disinterest; and judges are less likely
to decide cases with a view toward maximizing their future career opportunities, and are
therefore more likely to decide cases impartially, the less of a future they have.").
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other employment,20 and nine of the fourteenjudges who retired between 1990
and 1992 returned to private practice or took full-time teaching positions.17'
The average age of judges who returned to private employment is sixty-nine,
which is roughly equivalent to the mandatory retirement rule of age seventy,
used by many states across the country.272
A state pension system normally will be much less attractive than the
possible salary a retiring state judge could command in private practice.273
However, after spending years on the bench, a judge's prior client base may
have withered away, thus creating prohibitive start-up costs to re-entering
private, solitary practice. In addition, daily work and zealous client
representation necessitates long, inflexible hours, with all its accompanying
stress, uncertainty, and unpredictability. On the other hand, large firms with
more significant profit margins may be willing to pay a retired judge premium
wages for little work, in the hopes that the judge's reputation and connections
will attract clients or otherwise prove valuable.274 A rational judge seeking to
maximize future income would prefer employment with a large, private-sector
firm and its guarantees of ample leisure time and premium wages, over
retirement. The firm, likewise, would welcome the judge's addition. As a
result, mandatory retirement policies encourage judges to decide cases in a
manner that will curry favor with a particular litigant in the hopes of extracting
future financial gain. Judges are tempted to behave this way because there is
little cost in doing so. Trial judges have wide discretionary power, and their
decisions must be sustained absent an abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous
findings. 275 Therefore, a judge can easily justify a ruling without risking
reversal on appeal. Appellate court judges have no less discretion. In addition,
if an appellate judge has strong feelings about a case, the fellow members of
the panel normally let that judge write the court's opinion,276 thereby
facilitating clandestine and biased judicial behavior. In short, neither a trial
judge nor an appellate court judge has much incentive against deciding cases
in a manner that will maximize the judge's own economic self-interest.
270. VANTASSEL, supra note 28, at 14.
271. Id. at 40.
272. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 10.
273. See generally Winters, supra note 206, at 1-85 (compiling statutes detailing state
judicial pension plans).
274. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives andIndeterminacy in
Substantive Review ofAdministrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L.J. 1051, 1055 (1995) (arguing that
judges value their reputation because it enhances their influence within the legal profession).
275. See, e.g., Nat'l Oil & Gas, Inc., v. Gingrich, 716 N.E.2d 491,495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(using clearly erroneous standard of review); Porter v. Karivalis, 718 A.2d 823, 826 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1998) (using error of law or abuse of discretion standard of review).
276. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 20 (1993).
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Worse, even if the judge behaves with complete integrity, the existence of
incentives for misbehavior raises the appearance of bias. For instance, when
Judge Royce Savage left the federal bench in 1961, he drew widespread
criticism because he accepted a position as general counsel to Gulf Oil
Corporation, which he had acquitted of criminal antitrust charges less than two
years earlier. The New York Times commented:
No one has suggested, nor is there the slightest grounds for
thinking, that Judge Savage was moved by improper
considerations in the anti-trust case; and there is no law
against his now going to work for Gulf. Nevertheless, he
showed poor judgment in doing so, because his action tends
to lessen public confidence in the independence and integrity
of the Federal Judiciary. 7
When President Kennedy accepted Judge Savage's resignation, he expressed
similar concerns:
The reason that [judges] are appointed for life is so that there
can.., be no actual improprieties [and] no appearance of
impropriety.... I don't think that anyone should accept a
Federal judgeship unless prepared to fill it for life because I
think the maintenance of the integrity of the Judiciary is so
important.27 8
When other judges have left the bench in similar circumstances, they too have
been criticized for failing to avoid the appearance of impropriety. 79
Additionally, wholly apart from the effects of mandatory retirement upon
the judge in question, the policies have deleterious external consequences for
society generally, such as skewing the potential supply and demand for judges
who are nearing the state's retirement age. Imagine a state that appoints judges
for six-year terms and requires them to depart at the age of seventy. Initially,
if the appointing authority appoints, say, a sixty-four-year-old judge, the policy
risks forcing the judge out just as the judge is beginning to mature and develop
skills, confidence, and familiarity with the intricacies and novelties of the
law.28 Conversely, the appointing authority may be reluctant to appoint
individuals between the ages of sixty-four and seventy out of fear that the judge
277. VAN TASsEL, supra note 28, at 16 (citing DAVID STEIN, JUDGING THE JUDGES, 8-9
(1974)).
278. Id. (alteration in original).
279. See id.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 217-24.
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will not be around long enough to make a lasting impression upon the legal
landscape. Moreover, one must wonder who would be willing to take the
appointment only to be retired shortly thereafter. Given the high intellectual
and occupational start-up costs inherent in becoming an effective judge, some
individuals may simply continue in private practice rather than disrupt their
careers at a late stage in their lives. On the other hand, those who accept the
positions may be those who are uninterested in developing the skills needed for
excellent judging but see no better alternative. Mandatory retirement policies
simply do not further the core values of the judicial system.
If mandatory retirement policies are so harmful, then why do so many
states have them? There are two main reasons. First, the government, unlike a
private employer, has weak incentives for curtailing possible misbehavior. In
fact, the government itself may be the beneficiary of a judge's "end game"
biases. A judge nearing completion of her term might seek to ingratiate herself
with the state in order to get a different government appointment after leaving
the bench."' The judge, of course, would prefer private, large-firm
employment, but the judge might be so unattractive to private employers that
government employment would be the only viable option. Second, in cases
involving private parties, litigants bear the costs of "end game" biases, not the
government. Conversely, the legislative and executive branches derive ample
benefit from appointing new judges, either to repay their political allies or to
attempt to shape public policy in accordance with their views.
It is no secret that politics influences the judicial selection process." 2 Rick
Swanson and Albert Melone, in a review of Illinois Supreme Court decisions,
have shown that a judge's political affiliation strongly predicts the judge's
subsequent rulings.2"3 The benefits of the appointment power probably
outweigh any possible political fallout, for the quality of an elected official's
judicial appointments is probably an insignificant issue in most campaigns. In
any event, some states have legislative commissions that assist with judicial
selection.28 4 As a result, with additional actors deciding the composition of the
judiciary, elected officials can assume even less accountability for the opinions
281. Therefore, the judge would most favor the state in criminal cases when the state is a
party and public opinion magnifies pressures to convict. The bias towards the government might
be minimized if a state enacted a revolving door provision forbidding judges from accepting
government appointments for a fixed period of time following retirement.
282. See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Bench Battle, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2000, at 42,42 (examining the
political ramifications of challenging an incumbent judge); Jack Van Doren, Is Jurisprudence
Politics by Other Means? The Case ofLearned Hand, 33 NEwENG. L.REv. 1, 14 (1998) (stating
that those who select judges are aware of and act on political influence).
283. See Rick A. Swanson & Albert P. Melone, The Partisan Factor and Judicial Behavior
in the Illinois Supreme Court, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 303, 313-30 (1995).
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of the judiciary, even though political considerations may have influenced the
composition of the appointment commissions themselves. The situation is
markedly different from that which prevails in the competitive marketplace,
where employers are harmed by and vicariously liable for the misbehavior of
their employees. Elected officials within state government often suffer none of
the consequences of judicial misbehavior, so they have no true incentive to
minimize biased judicial decisionmaking.
Some might say that these concerns are obsolete because every judge who
does not enjoy lifetime tenure and salary provisions feels some degree of
pressure to decide cases in ways that will please the judge's appointer. Given
this observation, one might argue thatthe poor incentive structure of mandatory
retirement may be of little concern. Given that some elderly judges will be
ready to retire anyway, while judges eligible for reappointment are more likely
to seek an additional term of office, mandatory retirement may be the least
detrimental of all judicial employment policies. Put another way, the social
costs of mandatory retirement may not be very high because soon-to-be-retired
judges might behave independently of the policy.
There are two responses. The first is: so what? If a state constitution
requires repeated, periodic reappointment of a judge, then the resulting bias
from this selection process simply cannot be eliminated. As others have
observed, "Reality forces us to tolerate some bias [in the judicial sphere]. The
degree of bias we are willing to tolerate should be limited, however, by our
ability to avoid it."285 However, to the extent that a mandatory retirement policy
is not constitutionally protected, it is avoidable. Regardless, given the emphasis
of the judicial system on avoiding the appearance of impropriety, the low
potential for true misbehavior is irrelevant.
The second response attacks the argument on its own terms. The truth is
that mandatory retirement policies probably create a higher potential for biased
decisionmaking than periodic reappointment of all eligible judges. If a judge
seeks reappointment at the end of his term, various informal forces discourage
irrational or biased behavior.286 A judge's reputation, popularity, and prestige
are functions of competence, and "if he isn't on the ball this soon becomes
known and he gets a bad reputation in the legal community. '287 The appointing
authority, in turn, would face political pressure not to re-appoint him. On the
other hand, ajudge facing mandatory retirement would be less concerned with
her reputation among other judges than with her ability to gain favor with a
prospective employer and to lure or maintain favor with prospective clients.
Given the indeterminacy of law and ajudge's widespread discretion, a judge
285. Redish & Marshall, supra note 98, at 492.
286. See Posner, supra note 276, at 13-15.
287. Id. at 7.
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can find for either party without risking appellate reversal or even triggering
suspicion.
It is also true that every judge who voluntarily retires might use her
discretionary powers to decide cases in ways that will endear her to potential
future employers. However, mandatory retirement policies introduce bias with
potentially higher social costs. 285 First, mandatory retirement policies tend to
force judges to retire when they can still enter private practice, rather than at an
age when they would definitely prefer retirement. This increases the number
ofjudges who may behave improperly and the number of opportunities to do
so. Second, while a judge's personal retirement decision may occur
unexpectedly, the dates and names of judges who will be forced to retire is
public knowledge. As a result, mandatory retirement policies might encourage
"judge shopping," whereby firms with attractive employment opportunities
seek out those judges they believe are most susceptible to coercion. Judge
shopping is a species of forum shopping, which has been criticized for creating
additional litigation costs and unfair tactical advantages.8 9 Such a regressive
policy benefits deep-pocketed corporations represented by major, established
firms at the expense of the poor, weak, and oppressed whose counsel is
comparatively less equipped.
Perhaps the bias and appearance of impropriety created by an ill-advised
mandatory retirement policy is weaker than what confronted the judge in
Tumey v. Ohio,2' who stood to receive a direct, easily identifiable financial
benefit in exchange for his decisions.29 However, the Tumey Court was not
concerned with actual bias.2' Rather, it focused on insuring that judges
perform their essential job functions free from all "possible temptation to the
average man as a judge."2' Because any reasonable potential for financial
benefit raises the potential for biased or apparently biased decisionmaking,
mandatory retirement policies undermine a judge's ability to effectively
exercise the essence of judicial power. As Judge Abner Mikva of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals noted, a judgeship "is supposed to be the last
stop on the road. A judge shouldn't be thinking about going back to work for
a law firm that's coming before him."2" Indeed, even the appearance that the
288. A bias resulting from ajudge's freely chosen decision to retire, like the bias inherently
fostered in the reappointment process, is unavoidable. On the other hand, amandatory retirement
policy injects bias into situations where it would not exist.
289. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1507, 1507-17 (1995) (discussing theadvantages of transfer for
defendants over forum-shopping plaintiffs).
290. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 120-26.
292. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532.
293. Id.
294. VAN TAssEL, supra note 28, at 40.
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judge is basing rulings on the possibility of future self-interest is wholly
anathema to our system ofjustice.
For all these reasons, mandatory retirement is not an acceptable alternative
to impeachment. A court would grievously err to sustain the policies in the face
of a state's laws against age discrimination. Trading a cumbersome
individualized employment practice for an equally flawed generalized practice
furthers neither the goals of anti-age discrimination legislation nor the
administration ofjustice. Ifa state legislature wants to exempt appointed judges
from its general policy against age discrimination and is willing to jeopardize
the independence of the judiciary by doing so, then it should author an express
exemption to that effect rather than seeking to invoke the narrow BFOQ
exception.
VII. CONCLUSION
More than 200 years ago, Alexander Hamilton criticized New York state's
requirement that judges retire at age sixty.295 "I believe there are few at present
who do not disapprove of this provision," Hamilton wrote. "There is no station
in relation to which [mandatory retirement] is less proper than to that of a
judge.'"296
This Article has shown that state statutes against age discrimination in
employment may finally provide a weapon for attacking mandatory retirement
policies. Judges should not be viewed as policymakers who are exempt from
protection under state law. A state cannot prove that age is a BFOQ reasonably
necessary for judging cases independently and free from the appearance of
bias. Finally, mandatory retirement policies are not practical alternatives to the
individualized inquiries required by impeachment. A state, of course, could
continue implementing its mandatory retirement policy by expressly exempting
appointed judges from its age-based anti-discrimination laws. But that would
be unwise, for the policies, though perhaps well-intentioned, threaten judicial
independence. Rather than reinstating an obviously flawed policy, states should
recommit themselves to selecting qualified judges, freeing the judges from
political pressures, and removing the very rare incompetent judge in their
midst. This would promote everyone's interests in judicial independence,
accountability, and efficiency. It also would further society's important interest
in ending age-based discrimination in employment.
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